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This study draws upon organizational learning in the management domain and analogical 
reasoning in the psychology arena to examine the antecedents of acquisition success in a study of 
655 firms from 54 industries that conducted 2622 acquisitions from 1991 through 2005. Where 
previous work in this domain focused on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the measure of 
performance and ordinary least squares as the method of analysis, this work extends the literature 
by introducing Tobin‟s Q-ratio as the measure of performance and the autoregressive, integrated, 
moving average (ARIMA) model with transfer functions as the methodological approach. Earlier 
research on the influence of prior experience on focal acquisition performance has yielded 
interesting insights despite variation in findings. However, CAR is a short-term measure that is 
dependent upon stockholder reaction and does not fully anticipate the long-term fitness of the 
acquisition event. Ex ante, this study expected to result in a meta-narrative applicable to all 
merger and acquisition activity that could guide management of an acquisition program through 
the identification of the antecedent conditions of success. Prior research suggests that the Q 
measure is more relevant to managerial understanding and strategic orientation than insights 
gained from investor opinion as measured from cumulative abnormal returns. This study‟s 
findings suggest that acquisition experience, timing, antecedent performance, and interaction 
between experience, timing, and performance are all related to focal acquisition results. Further, 
when ARIMA is used to analyze the data and Q is the dependent variable, additional details and 
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v 
richer insights about the influence of the independent measures are gained. These findings justify 
the additional effort and time necessary for managers to use Tobin‟s Q. Additionally, while CAR 
does provide a particular set of actionable information, Tobin‟s Q-ratio provides a more robust 
long-term indicator of acquisition performance, especially where analogical reasoning is the 
process through which learning is demonstrated. 
vi 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisition (M&A) remains an important activity for many large firms because it 
provides the opportunity to gain both resources and capabilities. Nonetheless, it is well 
documented that many, if not most, acquisitions fail to realize profits for the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm and hence understanding the antecedent conditions that predict successful 
acquisitions remains an important area of research. One dimension that has demonstrated a 
significant impact on focal acquisition performance is learning from previous M&A activity. The 
majority of previous research on the effects of organizational learning on acquisition
1
 
performance adopts a traditional learning curve perspective
2
 that suggests that there are positive 
returns to experience: the more one does, the more one learns.  
To measure the impact of antecedent actions on focal performance, researchers in this domain 
have used event study methodologies that focus on the impact of the announcement to acquire on 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the dependent variable
3
 using traditional regression 
(Ordinary Least Squares; OLS) models. Although both the dependent variable (CAR) and 
evaluation technique (OLS) have yielded interesting results, they remain tentative and 
incomplete. Toward this end, this dissertation seeks to address both the methodological concerns 
associated with the use of ordinary least squares as a measurement approach and CAR as a 
measure of learning from previous acquisition experience. In order to execute on the aims of the 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of this research, I use merger and acquisition interchangeably although there is a substantive 
difference.  
2
 See Barkema and Schijvin (2008) for a review of the work in this domain. 
3
 Note that this study is firmly centered in the “learning from negative effects” body of literature within the merger 
and acquisition domain. This body of literature focuses on five previous studies as the central research examples: 
Haleblian & Finkelstein (1999); Finkelstein & Haleblian (2002); Hayward (2002); Porrini (2004); Schijven & 
Barkema (2007). 
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dissertation, an evaluation of both traditional outcome measures and an alternative measure, as 
well as an evaluation of traditional OLS procedures and multiple time series analysis with 
transfer functions are presented. 
This journey necessitates a discussion of organizational learning, analogical reasoning, and 
theories of strategic organization as well as theories around the methodological debates. A brief 
introduction to the rationale is presented here; chapter 2 develops the theoretical underpinnings 
associated with the core concepts and the hypotheses; chapter 3 presents the methods, sample, 
and model development; chapter 4 covers the results of the study; and chapter 5 discusses the 
results and implications and makes suggestions for the direction of future research. 
CAR is a valuable measure because it provides the researcher with interesting information about 
the announcement, the acquirer, and the target at a specific period of time. The announcement of 
one public firm to acquire another public firm is a discrete event that is typically highly 
publicized and the information about the event is readily available. The actual announcement to 
acquire is, presumably, an unexpected event that will impact the performance of the stock in 
some direction. Assuming market efficiency, CAR provides a useful proxy for expected 
performance of the firm‟s stock returns after the event takes place. However, using CAR as a 
measure of M&A performance only takes into consideration the stockholders of the firm to the 
exclusion of other stakeholders. Market efficiency assumptions would have the researcher 
believe that the market knows what is in the best interest of all stakeholders but recent market 
activities illustrate, at least anecdotally, that this assumption may be flawed. 
There are several underlying assumptions of the event study approach. Previous research has 
demonstrated that the abnormal returns that are realized by the shareholders in the short run (3 to 
 3 
11 days) are statistically similar up to a one-year period (270 days) (e.g. Hayward, 2003). With 
respect to using an event study methodology that employs CAR as the dependent variable, 
researchers do not go over the one-year window since too many other firm directed actions take 
place that may impact the returns (e.g. divestures, earnings, etc) and confound the data. 
However, as others have noted, it may take longer than one year for a firm to realize the 
synergies that may be gained from the acquisition (e.g. Cording, Christmann, and King, 2008). 
Researchers suggest that the short-run measure of CAR is an appropriate approximation of long-
term performance based on the efficient market hypothesis. Market efficiency arguments suggest 
that the stock price of the firm is a sufficient proxy for how the acquirer will perform in the long 
term and research has supported this argument at least for the one-year window (Hayward, 
2003). Given the argument that the acquisition may need longer to realize the true synergies that 
are anticipated from the activity, it would be helpful to tell a story that goes beyond the one-year 
window that CAR measures as well as take into consideration other stakeholders. As mentioned 
above, given the lessons of recent global economic activity, the true health of the acquirer ought 
to be evaluated rather than the market perception of the event.  
To “tell the story” about the ability of a firm to manage the actual acquisition activity it 
undertakes, it is necessary to use a dependent measure that takes into consideration how an 
organization directs the uses of its resources; that measure is Tobin‟s Q-ratio. Where CAR 
measures the wealth that adheres to the stockholder from the acquisition event, Q measures the 
creation of „wealth‟ for all stakeholders. Hence, Q also captures a firm‟s corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability that are omitted in the CAR measure that is limited to 
stockholder reaction. Since the Q-ratio includes the debt structure, asset valuation, and stock 
performance, it captures to some degree all stakeholders. In order to maximize the utility 
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function of all stakeholders, the firm ought to „learn‟ from its previous acquisition activity so that 
future performance improves from both relative and absolute measures which will maximize 
total economic wealth.  
As noted by earlier authors (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), research efforts in the 
organizational learning domain focus on a narrow manufacturing setting. Findings in the 
manufacturing domain are difficult to transfer to other arenas where causal ambiguity is higher. 
Within the manufacturing domain, organizational learning theory is focused on a simple action-
result relationship. The simple action-result relationship in the manufacturing setting is also an 
appropriate test of analogical reasoning. In the manufacturing setting, the ability of the individual 
to apply problem-solving transfer of an analogous experience to a target problem that must now 
be solved is relatively simple. The manufacturing environment on which previous organizational 
learning studies focus is similar to Duncker‟s (1945) candle problem where the test subject is 
provided a box of nails, a book of matches, and a hammer and instructed to attach a candle to a 
wall so that it will burn properly. In this experiment, this particular problem is one of a series of 
nine in which the desired result is for the subject to put the candle in or on the box, which they 
then attach to the wall. What Duncker (1945) found was that the test did not elicit the appropriate 
solution unless the subjects were told that one of their paired associates possessed the ability to 
help them. Even in this controlled and simple test setting, target problems failed to elicit 
analogical transfer from similar problems. 
Outside of the manufacturing system, however, the effects of antecedent experience are difficult 
to predict: the body of research on acquisitions is rapidly growing, and findings suggest 
significant variance in performance (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; 
Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Agrawal et al., 1992; Hayward, 
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2002; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Deutsch, Keilm & Laamanen 2007). Work in the time 
series (TS) analysis domain may provide insights into the sources of variation (e.g. Hopwood 
and McKeown, 1981; Hillmer, Lsarcker, and Schroeder, 1983; Willet and Sayer, 1994). 
TS research suggests that performance variation across studies is likely due to both traditional 
regression-based methods on event history data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997) and 
differences in outcome measures used to demonstrate acquisition success (Schoenberg, 2006). 
With respect to problems attributed to methodology, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) found 
that traditional regression-based methods break down in cases where time-dependent events 
occur due to right-censoring and time-varying covariates. Traditional regression methods (i.e. 
ANOVA, OLS, etc.) are inappropriate in time series studies since the data are often dependent 
upon previous events, thus violating assumptions of independence of observations.  
With respect to sources of variation associated with outcome measures, Schoenberg‟s (2006) 
evaluation of four common measures of acquisition performance demonstrates that all but one of 
the measures fail to take into account the long-term success of the event. The one measure that 
accounts for long-term performance suggests that acquisitions frequently fail, leading to 
subsequent divestiture (Porter, 1987) but may not take into account profit taking (Kaplan & 
Weisbach, 1992) or responses to environmental change (Capron et al., 2001). These findings 
further suggest that acquisitions are highly risky decisions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Pablo 
et al., 1996; Sanders, 2001), and that, in particular, acquisition behavior that entails aggressively 
pursuing large numbers of acquisitions may be indicative of higher levels of risk taking by top 
management teams and may be a result of managerial hubris (Ahuja & Katila, 2001), differences 
in compensation structure, or misattribution of success and failure of previous attempts. Given 
the mixed results and high level of risk taking, one might expect that acquisitions should be 
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undertaken only by highly skilled individuals; i.e., those who have learned from previous 
attempts.  
According to organizational learning theory, firm behavior is driven by routines that stem from 
experience (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and performance feedback (Greve, 2003). Furthermore, 
routines are only developed when experience is dedicated to a particular task which implies that 
the greater the antecedent experience directed toward a particular task, the more positive the 
consequent performance due to the probability of identification and retention of positive traits. 
Proponents of organizational learning grounded in routine development literature assume that the 
„process‟ of learning is independent of the outcomes of antecedent actions (Levitt & March, 
1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, proponents of organizational learning grounded in the 
performance feedback literature emphasize the role of the performance outcomes of antecedent 
activities on future behavior (Greve, 2003).  
Antecedent events form the basis of analogical reasoning that facilitates the decision making on 
the part of the acquirer. Under analogical reasoning, when the firm is faced with a target 
acquisition, it looks to analogous acquisitions that may enable the firm to adapt a known solution 
procedure for use with the target acquisition (Novick, 1988). Analogical reasoning is dependent 
upon the firm‟s ability to encode previous activities so that it may retrieve solution sets to focal 
acquisition attempts, thereby eliminating the need to develop new procedures to address the focal 
event. The activity of encoding „learning‟ from an event is referred to as a transfer effect. 
In the psychology literature, a transfer effect refers to performance of consequent activity that is 
influenced by antecedent events (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). Furthermore, research has 
identified two types of transfer effects: positive (Cormier & Hagman, 1987) and negative 
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(Novick, 1988). With respect to positive transfer effects, researchers suggest that where 
antecedent actions resulted in positive performance, the individual credits the action to the result 
and when confronted with a similar situation, takes the same action. Conversely, with respect to 
negative transfer effects where an antecedent action resulted in negative performance, when an 
individual is confronted with a similar situation in the future the individual will not take the 
action(s) that was linked to the negative outcome in the antecedent event. Additionally, Gick & 
Holyoak (1987) found that, regardless of outcome, as event similarity increases, success of 
transfer increases. 
Where research in the psychology literature focuses on the individual as the level of analysis 
(Dubin, 1978), this work examines whether negative transfer effects exist at the firm level in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions. Although the primary focus of the dissertation is on 
negative transfer effects, the coding of data facilitates an analysis of positive transfers. Therefore, 
the impact of both negative and positive transfers is evaluated. Pennings et al (1994) suggested 
that transfer effects motivate some acquisitions and a growing body of research has focused on 
the antecedent conditions of transfer effects (e.g. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstien & 
Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002; Porini, 2004). Yet, the results remain inconclusive. During the 
period from 1997 to 2006, over 356,000 mergers and acquisitions with U.S. and non-U.S. targets 
took place with a total value of over $28 trillion (U.S.) with an average acquisition cost of 
$172M. Given the quantity and value of acquisitions as well as the large commitment of 
resources, identification of key success factors remains a topic of interest. Acquisitions are 
complex events, and key success factors are causally ambiguous (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; 
Hayward, 2002), which makes clear identification of what leads to success illusive. Since 
organizations continue to view acquisitions as methods to build and maintain competitive 
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advantage by achieving economies of scale and scope, as well as for knowledge transfer and 
cooperative learning (Iyer & Miller, 2008), clear identification of the antecedent conditions of 
transfer effects in this context is important. 
There is conceptual and empirical justification for applying the individual concept of transfer 
effect to the firm level (Levitt & March, 1988). Studies in psychology found that individuals 
improved their performance on manual tasks with repetition (Thurstone, 1919). In the industrial 
setting, researchers discovered that productivity increased as the same unit was repeatedly 
manufactured (Wright, 1936). Some studies have documented the effects of routines and have 
shown that prior acquisition experience affects subsequent acquisition behavior (e.g. Amburgey 
& Miner, 1992; Baum et al., 2000). For a variety of reasons, acquisitions represent a particularly 
appropriate firm context in which to study transfer effects (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). First, 
the success rate of acquisitions is mixed (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). The mixed success rate 
of acquisitions implies that both positive and negative transfer occur. Unlike most other strategic 
actions, acquisitions are discrete and easily discernible events; both the occurrence and timing of 
an acquisition are relatively well known, which facilitates the research of transfer effects on 
future firm performance. Finally, the empirical acquisition literature has essentially relied on 
financial, economic, and strategic rationales, and much less on organizational explanations, to 
understand acquisition success and failure (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). For all of these 
reasons, studying transfer effects in acquisitions holds some potential to yield new insights on an 
important question to scholars in strategic management. 
To address the variation in findings across studies and to gain better understanding in the 
acquisition literature, a distinction between the effects of acquisition experience and performance 
feedback is made and an alternative measure of acquisition performance offered. This study 
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tested the research questions using longitudinal data (1991–2005) in a sample of 655 firms who 
conducted 2622 acquisitions. The guiding research focus is that firms learn from their previous 
acquisition experience; the more they do, the better they are at execution of future M&A. This 
research seeks to define the conditions in which experience leads to adaptive performance 
(Weick, 1979; Levitt & March, 1988; Hayward, 2002; Barkema & Schijven, 2008) through an 
alternative measure of acquisition outcome: Tobin‟s Q-ratio.   
Business publications and researchers alike have claimed that firms with previous acquisition 
experience outperform those without (Lubatkin, 1983); despite this fact, acquisitions are often 
unsuccessful (Porter, 1987). Given both the prevalence and ease with which CAR is used and 
calculated, an alternative measure would have to tell a different story of the transfer effects and 
be more informative of the long-term success of the acquisition. Therefore, different findings are 
expected on at least some of the variables in order to justify the use of Q. This research has the 
potential to further the understanding of the relationship between CAR and Q, refine 
understandings of negative transfer effects on acquisition performance, the conditions under 
which a firm better identifies future acquisitions, and improve our understanding of what actions 
firms may take to improve their acquisition programs. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured to explore why some firms outperform others in 
acquisition activity while others remain unsuccessful despite previous experience. The following 
section develops the theoretical basis and hypotheses of this effort; in the next section, a 
discussion of the sample and methods is presented; findings from a traditional event study are 
presented followed by the findings using Q as an alternative measure; comparison between the 
two measures are presented; and finally, conclusions and future areas of research are discussed. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ANTECEDENT LITERATURE 
There is no disagreement in the merger and acquisition (M&A) literature that there is 
heterogeneity of performance between firms. However, there is still much disagreement on what 
the causes of variation are in M&A performance. As mentioned above, the underlying 
assumption for this research is that learning from previous M&A activity accrues to the firm and 
influences future M&A performance. However, direct observation of when learning takes place 
is difficult and hence researchers look for proxies of when learning takes place. Learning, as 
defined here, takes place when we witness a change in behavior (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985) that leads to positive performance. In fact, there are many anecdotal illustrations 
that this takes place. For instance, consider the following statement from U.S. Bancorp‟s annual 
report: 
“Large banking acquisitions are not among our priorities; however, we continue 
to look at smaller fill-in opportunities to expand distribution in existing markets. 
We have been very successful at this type of expansion. In February 2007, we 
completed the acquisition of United Financial Corp., the parent company of 
Heritage Bank in Montana. The transaction strengthened U.S. Bank‟s franchise 
both by enhancing its existing market presence in certain regions of Montana and 
expanding into new regions of the state” (U.S. Bancorp, 2007: p. 12). 
In this statement, the board of directors attempts to communicate two things to its investors. The 
first statement is that the acquisitions are not part of their traditional competitive repertoire 
(Ferrier and Lyons, 2004) but that they have executed them successfully in the past. Second, the 
U.S. Bancorp attempts to communicate their ability to reason analogically – namely, that they 
can identify a target problem, apply source solution sets to the target problem, and thereby 
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strengthen their overall market position. Finally, they assume short-term returns translate to long-
term performance: “The transaction strengthened U.S. Bank‟s franchise.”4 
Although some learning is maladaptive, an organization is interested in only those behaviors that 
lead to improved performance. Therefore, the organization is more likely to reduce to practice 
only those activities that they believe lead to better results. Previous research has relied mostly 
on CAR as an indicator that learning from previous M&A experience has taken place. The 
primary contribution that this dissertation seeks to make is to suggest that Tobin‟s Average q-
ratio (q)
 5
 may be a better indicator that learning from previous M&A activity has taken place. 
In this section, a brief summary of some theoretical perspectives on M&A followed is presented 
followed by a discussion of analogical reasoning and how problem similarity and expertise relate 
to the act of reasoning from past experience to a focal application. The following section 
contains a discussion on the value of Q as an indicator that learning from antecedent acquisition 
activities has taken place and influenced behavior on a focal acquisition. Further, the anticipated 
relationship between CAR and Q is presented. Following the discussion of Q, the theory 
underlying the dissertation is developed. The following chapters present the sample and 
methods; finally, a discussion of the results and conclusions with suggestions for future research 
is offered. 
2.1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES DRIVING M&A ACTIVITY 
An organization might elect to expand business operations in a variety of ways. The literature is 
filled with mechanisms to grow an organization: greenfield projects; joint ventures; 
                                                 
4
 Emphasis added. 
5
 NOTE: Where Q is used, I refer to Tobin‟s Q-ratio as the formal derivation; where q is used, I refer to Chung and 
Pruitt‟s (1994) average q calculation. 
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intrapreneurship; R&D; and countless others. There are many figures for the rate of M&A failure 
but the one thing on which most agree is that on average, M&A activity fails to generate wealth 
for stockholders of the acquiring firm. Therefore, one must wonder why firms continue to engage 
in M&A activity at the rate they do. There are several theoretical perspectives that offer insights 
into why M&A activity occurs. In this section, a brief discussion of some of the rationales for 
these events is presented and includes the transaction cost economics perspective, the resource 
based view of the firm, institutional theory, and strategic choice. Although this is not an inclusive 
list, it provides some insight into the rationale for why management may elect to execute M&A. 
2.1.1. Transaction Cost Economics 
Economic perspectives of why merger and acquisition activity takes place, such as the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) framework, have provided the dominant theoretical 
foundations. Researchers in the TCE domain focus on how organizations should structure their 
activities to minimize costs relative to production functions in order to achieve Ricardian rents. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) identified markets and hierarchies, and later interorganizational forms 
(Williamson, 1991), as alternative modalities of institutionalizing organizational activity. TCE 
proponents stipulate that a firm decides to acquire assets when the ongoing costs of conducting 
business in the market are higher than the costs of organizing activities within the firm (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985). The concept and timing of the acquisition of assets in the market 
with respect to M&A activities will become particularly important when one takes into 
consideration boundary conditions of Q. 
In fact, in one study (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) have found that the organizational 
structure and prior acquisition experiences of the firm have implications for overall performance. 
The authors found that where prior acquisition experience led to higher rates of dissimilarity 
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between target and acquirer, the cost of managing the acquisition increased. Coase (1972) argued 
that internal costs to the organization are higher when there is greater dissimilarity between 
activities. Although the organization might view the introduction of diversified activities as 
business enhancing, the act might prove too costly to manage from the TCE perspective. 
However, when prior acquisitions are more similarly related, proponents of TCE argue, the cost 
of management decreases due to experience, economies of scale, and other commonalities that 
result in greater ease of integration. Hence, the argument for M&A is that as firms integrate 
similar activities, they reduce overall transaction costs and therefore gain a comparative 
advantage. One might argue then that all industries will reduce to a single company as they 
mature since greatest efficiency is achieved through singular operations. 
Although there is one argument from the TCE perspective for decreased transaction costs 
through increased concentration driving M&A activity, there is a competing position that states 
that direct competition between the acquirer and the target results in the need to increase 
protective (i.e. integrative) governance structures that induce the desired actions (Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005); this results in an increase of overall transaction costs. 
One final argument that coincides with the organizational learning perspective is that as firms 
conduct more M&A, they become better at the process overall. Therefore, the value that the 
organization generates, from both a stockholder and stakeholder perspective, through the 
acquisition activity increases as previous experience increases. There are several underlying 
assumptions in this argument that are developed throughout this work, but the framework is that 
the organization codifies and develops heuristics that facilitate analogical reasoning: 
management is able to apply the source problem set to target problems. Stated differently, 
management, through repeated experience with various governance structures, learns how to 
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execute them better and therefore lowers overall transaction costs (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Hayward, 2002; Villalonga and 
McGahan, 2005). 
2.1.2. Resource Based View 
From the resource based view (RBV) perspective, rare and difficult to imitate internal firm 
resources are key drivers of an organization‟s competitive advantage (Castanias and Helfat, 
1991). Penrose (1959) and Teece (1980, 1982) claim that a firm‟s entry into new product 
markets results from excess capacity in valuable resources that may be transferable across firms 
but subject to market imperfections (Penrose 1959; Teece, 1980, 1982). Proponents of the RBV 
stress the role of intangible capital such as organizational technological and marketing resources, 
which are particularly vulnerable to appropriation by partnering firms in alliances or in market 
exchanges. As a result, firms may choose more integrative forms of governance such as 
acquisitions when their intellectual capital is valuable, rare, inimitable, or organizationally 
dependent (VRIO) (Barney and Hesterley, 2006). 
Alternatively, the need to acquire resources creates dependencies between organizations and 
outside units such as suppliers, competitors, creditors, governmental agencies, and others. 
Barney (1986) introduced the concept of the “strategic factor market” which he defined as “a 
market where the resources necessary to implement a strategy are acquired” (p. 1231). From this 
perspective, strategic resources are those that have the potential to contribute to an organization‟s 
ability to achieve, at least in the short run, a comparative advantage in an industry. Barney 
(1986) suggests that firms can use tools such as Porter‟s Five Forces, Value Chain Analysis, or 
other methodologies, to develop better expectations about the future value of strategic resources. 
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Furthermore, Barney (1986) suggests that acquisitions represent one case of strategic factor 
markets: the market for companies. 
Since the returns to an organization are dependent upon the cost of the resources necessary to 
deliver to the product market, the existence of strategic factor markets has significant 
implications. The strategy that a firm attempts to execute, its theory about how it will gain a 
competitive advantage in an industry, is dependent in part on the strategic factor market. For 
instance, if a firm wishes to be a low-cost leader but the price of input of a strategic factor is 
more costly to the firm relative to its competition, then the firm will have difficult time in the 
execution of the strategy. Furthermore, the cost of the resource will be dependent on the 
competitive characteristics of the relevant factor market (Barney, 1986). Assuming that strategic 
factor markets are perfectly competitive, then it may be illustrated that the full value of the 
product-market strategy is anticipated ex ante and the firm is only able to obtain normal returns. 
It may further be demonstrated that the firm can only achieve above normal returns when the 
cost of acquiring a key input is less than its economic value. 
Given the above argument from the RBV perspective, one might make several statements 
regarding why M&A activity takes place. First, a firm might be expected to pursue an acquisition 
if the anticipated cost of acquisition of the resource is less than the purchase of the resource in 
the strategic market for that good; i.e. if the expected cost of the firm in the strategic market is 
less than the expected cost of the on-going purchase of the good in the strategic factor market for 
the input. This implies that the firm is able to accurately value, execute, and manage the ongoing 
operations of the source of the resource. Therefore, we would expect that an organization that 
has executed M&A in the past will outperform a firm that has little to no experience in M&A 
activity. When an announcement is made by an acquirer that it wishes to acquire another firm, it 
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makes a statement about its expected value of the target; namely, that the value of the target is 
greater than the value of the parts in the market. The outcome of the acquisition has one of two 
potentials: first, a positive return which suggests that the acquirer had an accurate, positive 
perception; or, second, a negative return in which case the acquirer‟s perception of the target was 
incorrect. This makes no statement to the degree or drivers but only to the directionality of the 
perception. 
Second, firms will deploy slack resources in an attempt to gain increasing control over valuable 
inputs into their production function. Through a tactic that increases concentration of ownership 
of a key input by a single company, the firm that owns the primary source of that input relieves 
its dependence on other suppliers and increases its own supplier power as a provider of the input. 
Therefore, the market would expect to see firms that perform well under this argument to 
become increasingly concentrated. From an organizational learning perspective, this firm would 
increase overall performance through improvements in two dimensions: first, they would 
improve their ability to acquire a specific business line; second, they would improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness of business with respect to the dominant business line. The overall 
result is that this organization becomes specialized and therefore generates firm specific 
advantages that may not be easily copied.   
Additionally, the strategic choice perspective grew out of economic arguments that firms pursue 
M&As to increase competitiveness or market power (Burt, 1980) through the erection of entry 
barriers or the creation of monopoly-type influence (Porter, 1985); to increase political power or 
the ability to influence governing bodies; to maximize firm‟s abilities to offer attractive products 
or services; and, to increase efficiency in research, production, marketing or other functions. 
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A competing perspective, however, is that the organization attempts to acquire a diverse range of 
inputs into their process so that they have some ownership of all aspects of their production 
function. In this case, the market would expect to see firms increasing their generalist abilities 
and a decrease in overall business concentration.  
Beginning with Pfeffer‟s (1972) seminal study, resource dependence theorists argue that 
organizations must acquire control over critical resources in an effort to decrease dependence on 
other organizations and to increase the dependence of other organizations on them. According to 
this theory, M&As are mechanisms to gain access to strategic factors, increase firm‟s power 
relative to other organizations, and reduce competitive uncertainty created by resource 
dependencies among firms. In addition, integration of complementary resources between an 
acquiring firm and a target may be difficult if not impossible for competitors to imitate (Teece et 
al., 1997), thereby strengthening the “O” portion of the VRIO6 framework. More specifically, 
this outcome is achieved when integration of two firms‟ resources makes it more difficult for 
competitors to compete against the merged business than to compete against them as individual 
entities. Research shows that integrating complementary rather than highly similar resources 
through an acquisition increases the probability that the newly formed firm will be able to create 
economic value through its operations (Harrison et al., 1991).  
Integration of two firms is a difficult process, especially where the key resource is knowledge 
based. However, learning from target firms and building new capabilities are yet other reasons 
that firms acquire targets since, from the learning theory perspective, knowledge is viewed as a 
firm‟s principal resource (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001) and M&A as increasing opportunities 
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 Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Organization. 
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for organizational learning (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988). Knowledge transfer from targets to 
acquirers is facilitated if companies make the same type of acquisition repeatedly due to 
experiential learning effects (Amburgey and Miner, 1992). Target companies often have unique 
employee skills, organizational technologies, or superior knowledge that are available to the 
acquiring firm only through acquisitions. In general, exploitation was the best for many 
acquisitions in 1980s and 1990s while financial reasons influenced acquisitions in the 1970s. It 
appears that capability-building acquisitions are the dominant reason for many acquisitions in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century (McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008). 
2.1.3. Tangential Perspectives  
Institutional Theory and Embeddedness 
Supporters of the institutional theory perspective suggest that environments impose 
pressure on organizations to appear legitimate and conform to prevailing social norms. 
These pressures motivate firms to merge to be in agreement with the prevailing rules, 
requirements, and norms of their business environments (Oliver, 1990). Firms in an 
industry may persist, over time, in a pattern of merger activity independent of actual 
transaction patterns. In other words, once firms begin to engage in M&A they may continue 
to do so for inertial (Amburgey and Miner, 1992) or institutional reasons. This view 
suggests that mergers occur because of repetitive momentum concerns for legitimacy 
(Amburgey and Miner, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In fact, Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2002) found that the M&A waves of the 1900‟s, 1920‟s, 1980‟s, and the 1990‟s 
were driven by profitable reallocation opportunities. The profitable decision to make the 
acquisitions during these waves was driven, in part by bandwagoning effects (McNamara, 
Habelian and Dykes, 2008), but also due to institutional expectations. As will be 
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demonstrated later, firms whose Q is above parity (1) are expected to acquire until their Q 
reaches unity. 
Several theories suggest that prior relationships between the focal firm and the target or 
partner are important to governance choices. Social embeddedness theorists suggest that 
two firms are more likely to engage in an alliance or merger when they have a history of 
prior relationship (Powell, 1990; Gulati, 1998, 1999; Podolny and Page, 1998). The 
embeddedness of firms in social networks enhances trust, which can be promoted by prior 
ties. Most think that acquisition behaviour diffuses through the network of interlocking 
directorates (Haunschild, 1993; Davis et al., 1995; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998). When 
a corporation's managers sit on another firm's board of directors, they create an interlock 
between their corporation and the other firm. In the process, they obtain access to 
information about and from that firm, which might provide them with knowledge about 
diversifying acquisitions, the financing strategies and takeover tactics used to complete 
them, and the identity of willing or vulnerable targets. They also obtain formal authority 
over that firm, which might provide them with influence over people who control access to 
capital or hold decision-making authority over specific desired targets. On the contrary, 
Palmer and Barber (2001) found little evidence that the number of boards on which a 
corporation's managers sat influenced the number of diversifying acquisitions. This 
contradicts previous findings (Haunschild, 1993; Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1995; 
Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) that suggest that interlocks and interlock centrality were 
associated with the pursuit of acquisitions. 
RBV, institutional theory, TCE, interlocking boards, social embeddedness, and resource 
dependence theorists suggest rationalizations for why M&A activities take place. However, 
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all of the preceding theories are dependent upon the ability of the organization to learn 
from acquisition activity and to conduct effective analogical reasoning from source to 
target problems. Where a firm has no previous experience in M&A, they are completely 
dependent upon an „expert‟ in order to guide them through the maze. Each of the theories 
presented in this section have suggested a condition where one might expect to see a firm 
engage in M&A, what the expected performance might be to the acquirer, and what the 
firm expects to gain. In the following section, mechanisms that allow a firm to maximize 
on its previous M&A activity in order to generate expertise and realize synergies are 
discussed. 
2.2. ANALOGICAL TRANSFER 
Analogical reasoning is the act of retrieving an analogous problem from previous experience 
(called a source problem) to solve a target problem (Novick, 1988). Retrieval of source problems 
to solve the target precludes the necessity of constructing new solutions, which is an important 
benefit of analogical transfer. Since analogical reasoning precludes the necessity for the 
development of new paradigms, it speeds decision making and offers the opportunity to decrease 
action time and reduce overall expense to the firm. However, analogical reasoning is often 
reduced to the form of a polysyllogism typified by the structure: 
All men are mortal; 
Greeks are men; 
Therefore, Greeks are Mortal. (Bochenski, 1951). 
 
Although the above example is a simple syllogism, the overall structure maintains where the 
reasoning is analyzable into two parts: the first part contains categorical propositions such that 
the final (conclusion) is presented as following from the proceeding; and, in the terms, the one in 
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the middle (the middle term) is common to the premises, the second term is common to the 
conclusion and one of the premises, and the third is common to the conclusion and the other 
premises. 
Although analogical reasoning provides many advantages, such as speeding decision making and 
increasing productivity, there are several costs that offset the potential benefits. First, the 
problem solvesr may not find an appropriate solution state because they have not had similar 
problems in the past or because they fail to appropriately match the source problem to the target. 
The first problem is analogous to Plato‟s aviary analogy7.  
In the aviary analogy, the mind is explained as an aviary full of birds where each bird represents 
a unit of knowledge or memory. In this model, to teach is to give away a bird to someone else 
and to learn is to stock one‟s aviary. Remembering, then, is to enter the aviary and catch birds. 
When a bird is caught, the individual is said to have remembered (i.e. recalled a previous source 
problem). This analogy is similar to the explanation in Cowen‟s “Embedded Process Model of 
Working Memory” (1999). In this model, Cowan uses several metaphors to describe his belief in 
the connection between working and long-term memory. One of these is a dark room with a 
single spotlight shining. Wherever the spotlight shines, working memory is present and 
everything in the dark is long-term memory. In this way, Cowen resembles Plato's division 
between birds in the aviary and birds that one has caught (remembered).  
Presumably, to catch a bird is to bring a long term memory into working memory. Fault is soon 
found with this metaphor and the character Socrates attributes this to hastily rushing towards an 
answer without first understanding the true nature of knowledge. Similarly, one might say that 
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 See Lee (1939) for a full discussion of Plato‟s aviary analogy. 
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since the majority of M&A activity fails to achieve profits for the acquirer, the acquirer failed to 
understand the true nature of the acquisition. An interlocutor might argue that it is not the 
acquirer that failed to understand the true nature of the target but rather it is the researcher who 
has failed to understand the true nature of the research environment. Hence, in the case of the 
first potential pitfall of analogical reasoning, the decision maker may fail to “catch the 
appropriate bird” or realize its relevance. 
The second „cost‟ associated with analogical reasoning is that the search for a source problem to 
apply to the target might only yield distracter problems that are only superficially similar to the 
target. For example, when the acquiring firm looks for targets, management often tries to 
remember other acquisition experiences. Because two acquisitions need not require the same 
management principles for successful completion (e.g. Schweiger and Goulet, 2000), the 
retrieved problem might not be relevant or even mislead the firm; this is equivalent to “grabbing 
the wrong bird in the aviary”. 
Finally, even if the firm is able to retrieve an analogue, the time spent on the search may be time 
wasted if the firm does not know how to use the information. More generally, analogical transfer 
may be difficult for a firm to implement because it requires that the organization attend to „noise‟ 
that distracts from the problem that needs attention (Holyoak, 1985). With respect to a problem 
state, an individual‟s experience exists on a spectrum from developed expertise to novice and the 
problem from ambiguous to simple. We might expect that as problem ambiguity increases, 
experts are more capable of appropriate analogical reasoning but where the problem is defined as 
„simple‟ reasoning is as productive for novices as it is for experts. Success or failure in 
analogical reasoning is attributed to two types of transfers: positive or negative. Whether the 
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transfer is negative or positive depends on the processes involved, which include problem 
representation, search and retrieval, mapping, and procedure adaptation (Novik, 1988). 
2.2.1. Positive Transfer 
Positive transfer is said to occur where the problem solver experiences positive results from an 
act and is able to apply the actions that lead to positive performance to a future target problem. 
The idea is that the individual is able to retain the details that lead to the positive outcomes. 
Research in the analogical reasoning domain stipulates that where the source and target problems 
share both structural and surface features, spontaneous positive transfer should occur regardless 
of the expertise of the problem solver (Novik, 1988). The structural features of a problem are 
determined by how the quantities of the problem are related to each other rather than by what the 
quantities are; the latter is surface information.  
However, where the source and target problem share a structural but not a surface relationship, 
one expects that experts are more likely to realize positive transfers than novices. In this case, the 
source is a remote analogue (Holyoak, 1985), and the search requires more depth. One expects 
that the greater the number of previous acquisitions, the more robust the source set from which to 
conduct analogical reasoning. In these cases, the target problem lacks cues that may lead to the 
identification of appropriate source problems. Therefore, the problem solver has to search more 
deeply for an analogy. 
2.2.2. Negative Transfer 
Negative transfer is said to occur where the problem solver fails to achieve positive results and 
encodes the reasons for failure such that she is able to apply the „lessons learned‟ to a future 
event. This type of transfer occurs because the source (a distracter problem) and the target share 
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surface but not structural similarity. In this case, Novik (1985) found that novices experience 
more spontaneous negative transfers than did experts. First, the problem solver might lack the 
appropriate expertise; i.e. the problem solver might lack a source problem to apply to the current 
state. Second, the individual may be unable to identify / retrieve a relevant source problem. On 
the surface, acquirers may identify similar characteristics between a potential target and a 
previous. For instance, the source and the target may both share SIC, size, or other relevant 
information. However, the two firms likely diverge on many key attributes such as distribution 
networks, rare factors, and human resources (to name a few). Nonetheless, the surface features 
provide a cue to the problem solver as to the potential source problem that provides an 
appropriate analogue.  
2.3. TOBIN’S Q-RATIO AND CAR 
Tobin‟s Q is an increasing function of the quality of a firm‟s current and anticipated projects 
under existing management (Lang, Stulz, and Walking, 1989). Furthermore, in the body of 
literature that looks at the market for corporate control, researchers have found that the market 
expects firms with high Q values to acquire while firms with low Q values should not (Blose and 
Shieh, 1997). Using an event study methodology, Blose and Shieh (1997) find that there is a 
significant positive relation between Q ratio and stock market reaction to capital investment 
announcements. However, Lang, Stulz, & Walking (1989) found that for M&A, the relationship 
between CAR and Q is non-linear and note that a Q ratio of 1 is an important boundary 
condition.  
A Q value of 1 marks an important boundary condition for a firm since the market expects firms 
with a Q higher than one to make some form of capital investment and those below 1 not to 
invest (Blose and Shieh, 1997). The implication is that a firm will continue to invest its slack 
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resources until its Q value reaches unity, at which point the management of resources is exactly 
equal to the replacement costs of the underlying assets. Therefore, we would expect firms with Q 
greater than unity to conduct slack searches (Iyer and Miller, 2008; Levinthal and March, 1981) 
for investment opportunities until all slack resources are exhausted. Additionally, Iyer & Miller‟s 
(2008) findings suggest that low-Q firms may conduct problemistic searches for potential 
acquisitions in order to address deficiencies while high Q firms conduct slack searches in order 
to redeploy these resources. This may account for both ends of the search process and why 
researchers have found that there is a correlation between merger waves and variance in Q ratios 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).  
If it proves to be the case that unity is as significant a boundary condition as previous research 
suggests, then a Q>1 firm is said to be value maximizing. From a management perspective, the 
Q>1 firm would benefit greatest so long as it stays above unity and continues to acquire. In order 
for the firm to stay above that threshold, it is necessary to „learn‟ from previous experiences to 
conduct efficient searches, execute transactions, integrate operations, achieve synergies, and if 
necessary, divest. However, as discussed below, there is an optimum threshold of both too much 
and too little acquisition activity where on one side the firm lacks absorptive capacity and on the 
other end there is organizational forgetting. The first hypothesis may be stated as follows: 
H1CAR: There will be a curvilinear relationship between prior acquisition 
experience and firm performance. 
H1q: There will be a positive relationship between prior acquisition experience 
and firm performance. 
As stated, this hypothesis is similar to prior research (e.g. Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) except that previous research illustrated a 
curvilinear relationship between firm performance and prior acquisition experience. However, 
 26 
previous research used CAR as an indicator of learning and looked at a much smaller time 
window. There are some problems associated with CAR as a measure of acquisition 
performance. The first problem has to do with the event study methodology and CAR which 
looks at the announcement as the „event‟ and does not consider consummation of the 
announcement as a necessary condition of the acquisition. The second problem has to do with the 
time horizon. The event study methodology assumes a short period of time in an attempt to 
reduce the potential confounding of other „events‟ that might impact stock performance; this 
window is typically a maximum of 270 days. In fact, researchers found no difference between 
270 days and 5 days after announcement (Hayward, 2002) which does support the market 
efficiency hypothesis but says nothing of the long-term relationship between market returns and 
acquisition performance. Hence, it is the announcement effect and not the actual acquisition that 
others in this domain have measured as a proxy for long-term performance of the „event.‟ One 
study in particular segmented the data in order to address the impact of CAR on managers‟ 
decisions to consummate the announcement (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1991). Finally, adjustments 
for market rate of return and risk are arbitrary with CAR (Fama, 1998) despite Haleblian and 
Finkelstein‟s (1999) findings that the risk adjusted measure of CAR and the modified measure 
are statistically similar. By itself, stock prices represent an arbitrary distribution of shareholder 
wealth or market value and therefore lack a natural common baseline that allows for comparison 
across firms or industries (Anderson, Farnell and Mazvancheryl, 2004).  
In the short run, ‟events„ move Q up and down (Tobin, 1976), and it is expected, therefore, that 
there will be a strong correlation between Q and CAR around the announcement of the event. Q, 
however, is a measure that is forward looking, risk adjusted, comparable across firms, and 
grounded in economic theory. AVG-Q provides a potential advantage over CAR since it is a 
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more long-term measure of performance. As stated above, CAR requires a short-term window – 
maximum of 270 days – whereas Q may be a better long-term indicator. Since it may take up to 
five years to fully achieve the desired effect of an acquisition, Q will serve as a better measure of 
performance rather than announcement. Given the longer window of evaluation and combination 
of both financial and accounting data, Q is not reliant on the same semi-strong market efficiency 
assumption that CAR does.  
2.3.1. Learning by Doing – The Impact of Previous Acquisition Experience 
Previous research suggests that an organizational learning epistemology is an appropriate 
referent for acquisition performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Organizational learning results 
from the active process of learning from direct experience, interpretation of that experience, and 
the conservation of the experience for future retrieval (Levitt and March, 1988). The 
organizational learning paradigm implies that organizations actively engage a learning process 
(i.e. learning is intentional) and that the process is managed. The organizational learning 
literature largely uses production measures as a proxy for learning effects (Darr, Argote, and 
Epple, 1995) that assume related activities. However, research suggests that performance 
improvement in the production process is not necessarily indicative of organizational learning 
since the cause of the outcome and learning are often ambiguous (March and Olsen, 1975).  
However, while experience may account for learning effects in tactics where the outcome is 
more clearly measured, it remains uncertain what impact learning has on strategic choices such 
as acquisitions. If learning curve effects accrue to acquisition performance, there are various 
factors that may mitigate the gains that would otherwise be realized. Acquisitions are 
heterogeneous (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hayward, 2002; Hayward, 2001), and as such, 
inferences differ across acquisitions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). As suggested earlier, 
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there is significant variation in acquisition performance which affects the intensity with which 
managers search for inferences from those experiences (Levinthal and March, 1993; Weick, 
1979). Finally, there is great irregularity in acquisitions occurrence. Even if firms generate 
adaptive inferences, those inferences may not be generated and applied in a timely fashion 
(Huber, 1991). 
All this suggests that acquisition experience per se may be insufficient to ultimately ensure 
superior acquisition performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Instead, such performance 
will more closely relate to a) the businesses that are acquired, b) the performance of those 
acquisitions and c) the temporal intervals between the focal acquisition and prior ones. The 
following sections examine each of these issues in turn. 
2.3.2. The Impact of the Similarity of Prior Acquisitions 
This section presents the CAR argument that prior acquisitions that are highly similar or 
dissimilar to one another will negatively relate to focal acquisition performance; and, the Q 
argument that increased focus or concentration results in improved efficiency and hence 
performance that support the efficient structure hypothesis (Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall, 
1984). According to the CAR argument, when prior acquisitions are highly similar, acquirers 
lack the generalist skills to appreciate a range of acquiring opportunities (Levinthal and March, 
1993). When prior acquisitions are highly dissimilar, acquirers lack the specialist skills to extract 
gains from any one type of acquisition. 
There are a variety of reasons that firms may acquire another firm. An organization may use 
acquisitions as a mechanism to acquire new resources and capabilities in order to enter new 
markets (Amburgey and Miner, 1992); strengthen an existing market position (Baker and 
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Bresnehan, 1985); elaborate positions in existing markets (Ahuja and Katila, 2001); or, leverage 
capabilities (Hamel and Prahalad, 1993). Market-strengthening acquisitions are particularly 
common and path dependent because they exploit existing market positions and capabilities 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). A series of highly similar acquisitions reflects a singular logic to, 
say, eliminate competitors (Anand and Singh, 1997; Baker and Bresnehan, 1985; Barton and 
Sherman, 1984), attain economies of scale and scope (Scherer and Ross, 1990) and develop 
technical knowledge (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). In turn, managers develop standardized and 
specialized routines so as to make those acquisitions once again (Szulanski, 1999). As this 
expertise evolves, gains from deployment become more accessible, transparent and immediate, 
prompting further, similar acquisitions; this supports the efficient market hypothesis. Yet 
because these acquirers fail to explore new markets and capabilities, they cannot attain new 
knowledge bases. Therefore, they are vulnerable to competitors whose acquisitions co-evolve 
with markets (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Penrose, 1959). When problems are open-ended (e.g., how 
to develop better returns from acquisitions), diverse experience helps lower the risk of making 
Type 1 (rejecting a hypothesis that is true) and Type 2 (accepting a hypothesis that is false) 
errors in tackling related or sub-problems. 
Adaptive performance from problems is associated with variety in the way that individuals, 
groups or firms solve them (Ashby, 1956; McGrath, 2001). Research and development groups 
with diverse prior experience develop greater capacity to identify, assimilate and apply new 
research and development opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). It follows that diverse 
acquisition experience might yield rich inferences about the causes of acquisition performance 
(Cheng and Van de Ven, 1996; McGrath, 2001). Performance differences between acquisitions 
in different markets help generate inferences about a) returns that are available in different 
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markets and b) whether the acquirer‟s capabilities can compete for those returns (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). Different acquisitions also help firms to evaluate whether and how 
implementation routines are suited to their acquisitions. To illustrate, market-entering 
acquisitions require different integration skills than those that are needed to absorb another 
firm‟s manufacturing capacity (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). By virtue of this variety, firms 
become better equipped to identify and respond to growth opportunities (Weick, 1979). Yet, a 
sequence of diverse market-entering acquisitions is also problematic. Research often shows that 
acquirers experience adverse performance from such acquisitions (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Levy & 
Sarnat, 1970; Porter, 1987). Persistent entry into new markets slows specialized learning about 
advantage that resides in specific markets. Disparate market positions and capabilities confound 
firms‟ abilities to exploit market power, niche market positions, economies of scale, and so on 
(Baker and Bresnehan, 1985). What can emerge is a loosely coupled, relatively incoherent 
federation of businesses with different attributes and administrative demands (Baker, 1992; 
Teece et al., 1994). Here, the bureaucratic costs (e.g., information-processing demands) of 
managing disparate businesses can overcome possible efficiencies from internalizing 
transactions (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). 
The foregoing suggests that acquiring is a balancing act between exploiting existing 
opportunities and exploring for new ones. Acquiring a series of highly similar businesses 
promotes specialized learning about that business, but prevents learning about other businesses. 
If these acquirers make another similar acquisition, they become even more specialized. Yet, 
these firms lack the skills to effectively select and implement non-conforming acquisitions. 
Acquiring a series of highly dissimilar businesses helps firms to discover new bases of 
knowledge and experience, but prevents specialized learning about any one business. If these 
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firms make another diverse acquisition, they become even more administratively stretched and 
incoherent (Teece et al., 1994). Yet, these firms lack the skills to effectively select and 
implement acquisitions that exploit an existing market position. 
Therefore, both types of acquisition experience are detrimental to selecting a focal acquisition 
irrespective of the nature of that acquisition. It follows that firms with experience in acquiring 
businesses that are not too similar or different to one another are best placed to select a focal 
acquisition. Put another way, this experience enables firms to gauge what is special, unique and 
important about that opportunity. Thus, an inverted U-shaped relationship will govern the 
relationship between a) the similarity between the businesses of prior acquisitions and b) focal 
acquisition performance. This is restated below: 
H2CAR: There will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between the similarity of 
antecedent businesses and focal acquisition performance. 
H2q: There will be positive relationship between the similarity of antecedent 
businesses and focal acquisition performance. 
One reflects the short-run investor expectations of business organization while the other reflects 
the long-term need for continued improvements to efficiency. As discussed, the performance as 
well as the nature of prior acquisitions predicts firms‟ abilities to generate adaptive inferences 
from their acquisitions (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1993). The following 
section presents the impact that adaptive performance has on focal acquisition activities. 
2.3.3. Learning from Prior Performance 
Prior literature suggests that organizations tend not to search deeply for inferences from prior 
acquisitions that they perceive to be successful or large failures. This rests on the belief that 
successful acquisitions promote „satisficing‟ that limits the desire to search for new and superior 
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solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). Likewise, large failures limit organization search since it 
questions competence that may induce market decline. Further, failed acquisitions lead to 
„attributional errors‟ in which managers attribute performance to factors outside their control, 
including industry conditions or surprises about the target firm (Kelley, 1971). Unlike the 
problems associated with gains or large losses, small losses highlight problems without 
suggestion of incompetence. Therefore, firms are less likely to learn from acquisitions that result 
in gains or large losses. Based on the above argument, small losses should contribute to 
organizational learning and superior performance on the next acquisition. Moreover, the greater 
firms‟ experience with these small losses, the greater the scope for this learning.  
H3CAR& q: The greater the number of small losses incurred in antecedent 
acquisitions, the greater the focal acquisition performance. 
The foregoing argues that the nature and performance of prior experience predicts the types of 
inferences that firms will glean from them. Yet, unless inferences are generated and applied in a 
timely fashion they assume limited value (Huber, 1991). Thus, the following section addresses 
the temporal intervals between acquisitions. Although it is not tested here, it is further expected 
that when firms are below unity for Q, the rate of small loses will impact the performance and 
even timing between acquisitions. 
2.3.4. Timing of Acquisitions 
Acquisition and installation of capital goods costs more the faster the capital stock is expanded 
and therefore Q may always be at unity; however, it takes variation in the speed of investment to 
keep it so (Tobin, 1976). Research shows that a very long or very short interval between two 
projects hampers project development (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994). On the one 
hand, very long intervals increase the likelihood that the inferences from the prior experiences 
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are unavailable, inaccessible and inapplicable (Argote et al., 1990; Ginsberg and Baum, 1998). 
Managers are more reluctant to codify learning and otherwise generate inferences from activities 
that they do not expect to repeat (Winter and Szulanski, 1998). Further, learning resides in 
routines as well as the people who know how to operate those routines (Levitt and March, 1988). 
These people may be unable to apply learning to a focal acquisition because they have, say, left 
the firm or moved to another division. Unless the learning is well codified, it may not be 
compelling, relevant, and salient to managers who worked on the focal acquisition but not the 
prior one. On the other hand, firms may be unable to generate meaningful inferences from very 
recent acquisitions. Acquisition fieldwork and laboratory experiments show that managers 
cannot carefully evaluate acquisitions that occur in quick succession (Haunschild, Davis-Blake 
and Fichman, 1994). Managers often experience an adrenaline rush or over-exuberance to 
acquire (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Preoccupied with doing the next deal, these managers ignore 
inferences from prior acquisitions, particularly if those inferences raise doubts about the merits 
of the focal acquisition (Haunschild et al., 1994). Thus, inferences fail to take root from 
acquisitions that very quickly follow one another. 
All this suggests that the process of generating inferences can be derailed when there are very 
long and very short intervals between acquisitions. In turn, this will reduce focal acquisition 
performance as restated below: 
H4ACAR & q: There will be a curvilinear relationship between time between the 
previous acquisition and the focal acquisition and acquisition performance. 
H4BCAR & q: There will be a curvilinear relationship between average time 
between acquisitions and acquisition performance. 
The foregoing elaborated theory on when firms learn from their acquisitions experience. In 
particular, the previous study hypothesized that firms will learn from acquiring businesses that 
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are neither too similar nor dissimilar to prior ones. Further, small losses from acquisition 
experience will promote search for rich inferences from acquisition experience. Finally, 
inferences are generated and applied more effectively when there is neither too little nor too 
much time between acquisitions. In turn, it is expected that this learning will be adaptive and so 
positively relate to focal acquisition performance. The current sample and methods are outlined 
that replicated the hypotheses of previous research. 
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Figure 1: Proposed Theoretical  Model 
Figure 1 is a summary of the proposed theoretical model with expected directionality of findings. 
Where more than one symbol is presented on the line, the symbol on the right represents the 
expected findings for Q while the symbol to the left of the line is the expected findings for CAR.
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Table 1: Summary of Previous Research 
on Negative Transfer Effects with Respect to Acquisitions. 
Authors Hypotheses & Findings Data Set D.V. I.V. Controls 
Haleblian & 
Finkelstein (1999) 
1a) Antecedent exp positively related to 
performance (not supported) 
449 'large' 
acquisitions between 
1980 and 1992 
Acquisition 
Performance Experience 
Acquirer-to-Target 
relatedness 
1b) Antecedent exp not related to 
performance (not supported)   Target-to-Target Similarity Relative acquisition size 
1c) Antecedent exp negatively related to 
performance (supported)    Stock consideration 
2) U-Shaped relationship between 
Antecedent exp and performance 
(supported)    Acquirer slack 
3) Positive relationship between similarity 
and performance (supported)    Attitude 
    
Acquiring firm 
performance 
    Period Effects 
Finkelstein and 
Haleblian (2002) 
1) Performance positively associated with 
similarity (supported) 
192 'large' completed 
acquisitions by 96 
acquirer between 
1970 and 1990 
Acquisition 
performance 
Acquirer-to-Target 
similarity Relative acquisition size 
2) Performance greater for antecedent than 
second acquisition (supported)   Second acquisitions Stock consideration 
3a) When second acquisition is similar to 
antecedent, performance is greater in 
second (not supported)   Relative acquisition size Acquirer slack 
3b) When second acquisition is dissimilar 
to antecedent acquisition, first outperforms 
second (supported)   Stock Attitude 
   Slack 
Acquiring firm 
performance 
   Attitude Year 
   Acquiring firm performance  
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Hayward (2002) 
1) Inverted U-shaped relationships between 
performance and similarity of antecedent 
experience (supported) 
350 focal 
acquisitions made by 
100 'large' acquirers 
between 1990 and 
1995 
Acquisition 
performance Acquisition experience Year 
2) Positive relationship between number of 
antecedent small loses and focal 
performance (supported)   
Similarity of antecedent 
acquisitions Industry 
3a) Inverted U-shaped relationship between 
antecedent acquisitions and focal 
performance (supported)   Small acquisition loses Firm size 
3b) Inverted U-shaped relationship 
between time elapsed between acquisitions 
and performance (supported)   
Timing of antecedent 
acquisitions Firm performance 
   Timing of focal acquisitions Business similarity 
    Relative acquisition size 
    Contested bid 
    Foreign bid 
    Method of payment 
    Use of advisor 
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3. METHODS 
The unit of analysis for this study is the transaction since the hypothesis is that at the transaction 
level, firms that have engaged in previous acquisitions will outperform firms that have not and 
that there is an optimal level of timing and amount. Given the preceding, it is necessary that at 
each transaction, the requirements are met. This section is divided into three parts. The first part 
is the data collection and summary information of the sample set which includes a discussion of 
the variables collected. The following section is a discussion of the cumulative abnormal returns 
measure. Finally Tobin‟s Q measure is discussed.  
Table 2: Representation of Sample Collection 
1 Month 
Prior
1 Week 
Prior
1 Day Prior Announcement 1 Day Post 1 Week Post 2 Years Post 3 Years Post 5 Years Post
3 Day Period
11 Day Period
2 Year Period
3 Year Period
5 Year Period
Event
Event
Event
Event
 
Transfer theory research in the psychology literature typically consists of a two-stage experiment 
comprising a training phase (the learning period) and a testing phase (the focal acquisition 
period) with the latter used to determine how the training period influenced performance in the 
testing stage (Ellis, 1978; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). Error! Reference source not 
ound. is a graphic representation of the sample collection method. Each event represents one line 
 38 
(unit of analysis) in the data set. One firm may have several events in the data set that are 
collected over a five year period. The announcement date serves as the referent point for each 
event. Appendix B, tables 15 and 16 provide the matrix of firms‟ movement through the 15-year 
study period. The first column is the number of times that a firm has executed a merger or 
acquisition. Therefore, in year 1996, there are 46 firms who enter the study for the first time; 
they had their first „experience‟. What is interesting to note is that all firms started the study with 
a base set of experiences of “0.” We would expect to see only 46 firms execute their first merger 
or acquisition at that time with no firms experiencing more than 1. However, as illustrated in 
Appendix BError! Reference source not found., there are 14 instances of 2 acquisition 
experiences and even 1 instance of 5 acquisition experiences in the same year; one firm executed 
5 acquisitions in 1996. 
The far right column in Appendix B illustrates the number of times the corresponding 
„experience‟ took place from the far left column.  Error! Reference source not found. is a 
graphic representation of the matrix that illustrates the movement of acquisition experience 
through the sample period. The general trend reflects the M&A wave illustrated by both 
McNamara et al. (2008) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). Acquisition activity during this 
period rose to a high of 385 „events‟ in 1998 and quickly dropped off to only 37 events in 2005, 
a mere 6% of the high. 
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Figure 2: Experience Movement through Study 
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3.1. SAMPLE 
The total sample contains all publicly disclosed acquisitions for the fifteen year period from 1991 
to 2006 for U.S. domiciled firms. Although previous samples consisted of only the 100 largest 
U.S. domiciled firms by market capitalization as reported by the Fortune magazine from six 
industries
8
, this sample contains all firms regardless of size or SICs. It was decided to extend the 
sample in order to further test whether the findings are generalizable across industries and firm 
size. The full sample set contains 2,190 firms that undertook 8,898 acquisitions. For this study, a 
random sample of 665 firms that completed 2,699 acquisitions were selected which represents 
30.33 percent of the total amount of events in the database
9
. The focal deals include only 
domestic acquisitions of minority interests, material assets, and wholly acquired deals. The 
sample includes a natural morbidity rate that is accounted for by either firms not having enough 
time since the last announcement and their last return to complete the full five year measurement 
period, or the firms themselves were acquired after their last announcement. The result is that of 
the 2,699 firms included in the sample, 2,625 had enough information available to calculate their 
q at announcement; 2,511 had information available at the two-year measurement; 2,371 for 
three-year; and, 2162. Eighty percent of the study sample „survived‟ to the full five year period. 
It is expected that the remaining sample will demonstrate similar morbidity rates. 
                                                 
8
 The six industries in the Hayward sample consists of: drug and medical supplies, food processing, forest products 
and packaging, oil and gas refining and production, regional banking, and telecommunications services. Hayward 
makes no distinction for how the sample of the six industries was defined. 
9
 Note that the remaining 70 percent of the database are holdouts for future testing and theory validation. 
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In a previous study (Hayward, 2002), a ten-year sample was divided into a five-year learning 
period and a five-year focal period with only the focal period used as the measurement period. 
However, other studies have excluded the five-year learning period and used their full data set as 
the measurement period (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999;). A 
decision was made to omit the learning period and use the full fifteen year time as the 
measurement period which ensures that all firms start at the same base-line of “0” learning10. The 
full fifteen year period ensures that a large enough sample can be obtained to measure q for a 
five year period after the acquisition event. 
The primary source of acquisition data came from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
database provided by Thomson Financial. The SDC Platinum database is frequently used in 
acquisition research and provides comprehensive information on acquisitions (Finkelstein and 
Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002; Deutsch, Keilm and Laamanen, 2007). The Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) was used to obtain information on liquidating value of a 
firm‟s preferred stock. COMPUSTAT was used to obtain information on the outstanding shares 
of the firm, prices over the one-year window provided in SDC, and total assets of the firm. 
In Appendix A, summary information of the sample set for the study is provided. Of particular 
note is that out of this random sample from the total population SIC 60, Depository Institutions, 
and SIC 67, Holding and Other Investment Offices, account for a large number of the total 
events. This may be due to period effects that represent consolidation in those industries around 
                                                 
10
 I recognize that not all firms have “0” M&A experience before the first one in the dataset. However, since I am 
interested in a time series that evaluates the relationship between a series of events, assuming a baseline of zero 
provides a grounding point for the series. As will be illustrated later, since the series is a count of proceeding events, 
any other assumption would have be as appropriate since the absolute number of events is what would be 
considered. 
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the time period under consideration. Tests for both industry and time effects were conducted to 
determine the impact on the overall study. No period or time tests were found significant; 
therefore, we can assume that the sample is a good representation of the total population. 
3.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Two measures of the dependent variable, acquisition performance, were measured. CAR is the 
level of wealth that acquirers generate from their focal acquisition. The methodology attempts to 
explain whether differences in the performance of acquisitions of the sample are explained by 
characteristics of antecedent acquisitions. A significant and positive relationship between prior 
experience and the performance of future acquisitions suggests that the firm has learned how to 
subsequently generate favorable acquisition performance whether it is through better investment 
and diversification decisions (Jose, Nichols, & Stevens, 1986; Malkiel, von Furstenberg, & 
Watson, 1979), the relationship between ownership equity and firm value (McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), performance and tender offer gains (Lang, 
Stultz, & Walkling, 1989), or financing, dividend, and compensation policies (Smith & Watts, 
1992).  
As a traditional measure of firm performance and as the null hypothesis (there is no difference 
between previously used measures and Q measures), both a conventional event study 
methodology that measures CAR
11
 (Schoenberg, 2006; Hayward, 2002; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999) at the announcement date and an MTS (ARIMA) with transfer functions were used. This 
measure gauges whether, a priori, investors believe that acquirers have selected the right 
                                                 
11
 I am grateful to Professor Hayward for his comments on how he conducted the event study to ensure that my 
study replicated his. 
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acquisition. The event study methodology assumes that markets are informationally efficient. 
The market efficiency assumption suggests that security prices reflect all publicly available 
information and that fluctuations in market price are indicative of new information which makes 
the CAR measure an appropriate proxy for acquisition performance. Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1999) give the CAR measure as: 
ε = Rit - Rmt    (1) CAR 
where Rit is the return of the stock i on day t and Rmt is the return on the market portfolio on the 
same day. The DJIA is the measure for the market portfolio. Additionally, measures over both a 
three day period (the announcement day plus and minus one day) and an eleven day period (the 
announcement day plus and minus five business days; see Error! Reference source not found.) 
re used. The abnormal return measure appears to be a good measure of acquisition performance 
in the short-run since previous research suggests that it also predicts the ultimate performance 
(Healey, Krishna & Ruback, 1992) whereas the Q-ratio will indicate the actual result of the 
ultimate performance. The implication is that since the cumulative abnormal returns measures 
the performance of the acquisition announcement over a shorter period of time and since 
acquirers are not likely to announce other information at the same time as an acquisition, then 
there is less likelihood that outside information impacts the acquisition announcement (personal 
correspondence with Hayward; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  
Approximate q-ratio (hear after q) prior to investment will be measured as follows
12
: 
                                                 
12
 Formula derived from Blose and Shieh (1997) and Chung and Pruitt (1994). 
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  (2) q 
Where D, E, and P represent the Debt claims, Common Equity, and Preferred Equity in the F – 
financial markets – respectively and A is the assets of the firm in the R (real asset market). This 
measure of Q is taken from Chung and Pruitt (1994) who found that this approximation of Q 
accounted for 96-percent of the variance of the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) measure of Q. 
Therefore, as a parsimonious measure of Q, q represents a sufficient measure that balances 
efficiency and efficacy. The estimation of q is decomposed as follows: 
  is the value of the firm‟s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets plus the 
book value of the firm‟s long-term debt; 
  is the number of common stock shares outstanding times the share price; 
  is the liquidating value of the outstanding preferred stock; 
 finally,  is the book value of the firm‟s total assets.  
The measure of performance then is the change in q between t
0
 and t
1
, t
2
, t
3
, t
5
 as indicated in 
formula 2: 
    (3) Performance 
Where CAR represents investor expectations of future performance by the firm, Q represents the 
actual ability of managers to competitively use their resources and capabilities. Over time, Q 
captures a firm‟s efforts to manage debt through payoffs and loans and preferred and common 
stock through issuances and buybacks. CAR, on the other hand, only captures the current price of 
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the stock on the market. In this regards, Q captures the strategy of the firm to gain and maintain 
competitive advantages. 
3.3. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Acquisition experience: Firm acquisition experience is the sum of recent acquisitions undertaken 
by the firm, from 1991 to the focal deal. All firms were assumed to have made their first 
acquisition during the focal period (1991 – 2005) and received an initial experience score of 0. 
Controlling for firm experience is important since the results of the similarity measures are 
determined according to the number of preceding acquisitions. 
Similarity of Prior Acquisitions: The measure is a simple percentage score that calculates the 
percentage of prior acquisitions that conform to the most common 4 digit SIC code. Thus, if all 
prior acquisitions are within the same SIC code, the score is 1. If no two acquisitions share the 
same SIC code, the score is 0. If two out of the firm‟s four acquisitions share the same code, the 
score is 0.5 and so on. The scores are multiplied by a factor of 10 so that there squared terms 
represent higher scores when the model is an inverted curvilinear relationship. 
Small acquisition losses: The number of times a firm recorded an announcement loss of less than 
3% as measured by the cumulative abnormal return methodology used above. 3% is an arbitrary 
rate of small losses but was used in the Hayward (2002) study where he found that 1 and 2% 
yielded similar results. Similar models for q were tested.   
Timing of prior acquisitions: The mean number of days between prior acquisitions, excluding the 
focal acquisition. If the firm has only one prior acquisition, the maximum interval is imputed. 
This is the date of the acquisition less the date when the first acquisition was recorded (i.e., 
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January 1, 1991). To model the curvilinear relationship tested, the squared term of this variable is 
also included. 
Timing of focal acquisition: The number of days between the focal acquisition and the one before 
it. When the focal acquisition is the firm‟s only one, the same imputing procedure as above is 
used. Again, the same inverted U-shaped relationship is hypothesized. 
Discount factors: The choice of discount rate to apply to the value of prior experience is 
somewhat arbitrary (Hayward, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Argote et al., 1990). The baseline 
assumption is no discounting, the approach adopted by Hayward (2002), and Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999). Other variables are subjected to other discount rate assumptions, including 1 
divided by the years elapsed from the prior experience.  
Use of advisor: A simple percentage score that calculates the percentage of prior acquisitions that 
use and advisor. Thus, if all prior acquisitions are use and advisor, the score is 1; if no 
acquisitions use one, the score is 0. The scores are multiplied by a factor of 10 so that there 
squared terms represent higher scores when the inverted curvilinear relationship is modeled.  
3.4. TRANSACTION LEVEL VARIABLES 
Contested bid: A dummy variable where 1 denotes a contested bid (i.e., the acquirer engages in a 
contest with another suitor for the target) and 0 is otherwise. This factor is often found to reduce 
acquirer returns because the price of the target is bid up in these situations (e.g., Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997). Lang et al (1989) found that opposed offers are more likely in disciplinary 
takeovers and constitute a subset of acquisitions in which managerial performance may play a 
more important role. 
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Foreign bid: A dummy variable where 1 is the acquisition of a non-U.S. operation and 0 is the 
acquisition of a U.S. operation. Foreign acquisitions may generate lower returns to the extent that 
the acquirer is less familiar with such targets. 
Method of payment: A dummy variable where 1 is a cash offer and 0 denotes stock payments or a 
combination of cash and stock. Research suggests that stock financed acquisitions generated 
significantly lower returns than cash financed ones (e.g., Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
3.5. CONTROL VARIABLES 
Previous researchers have identified numerous factors that explain acquisition performance 
including the firm‟s industry, its financial condition and the nature of the acquisition undertaken 
(Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Agrawal et al., 1992).  
3.6. INDUSTRY AND TEMPORAL LEVEL VARIABLES 
Year of acquisition: Series of dummy variables for the years 1991 to 2005 where 1991 serves as 
the residual category. Both the year and industry dummies will be included in all the estimation 
equations. This is consistent with prior studies to account for period effects (Hayward, 2002; 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Haunschild, 1993). 
Industry: Codes for the 2-digit SIC identifier are used as dummy variable in order to remove firm 
level effects. This study consisted of 54 2-digit SIC where the 10 served as the residual. 
3.7. FIRM LEVEL VARIABLES 
Firm size: Firms were standardized (Z-scores) from their sales preceding the acquisition 
announcement. 
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Firm performance: The total shareholder returns of the acquiring firm in the year prior to the 
acquisition. This variable controls for overall firm performance as opposed to a firm‟s 
acquisition performance calculated as follows:  
    (4) Total Shareholder Returns 
Business similarity: Controls for the similarity of the focal acquisition to the firms‟ existing line 
of business using the same scale as discussed above for the similarity of prior acquisitions 
(Rumelt, 1986).  
Relative acquisition size: The final purchase price of the acquisition as a percentage of the 
market capitalization of the acquirer at the time of acquisition announcement. With their larger 
impact, larger acquisitions are more able to affect acquisition returns. 
3.8. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Regression and other econometric procedures have historically been utilized to specify and 
estimate the relationships between sets of time series such as CAR and M&A as well as to 
predict future results of a times series of interest (shareholder wealth). Great effort and attention 
must be taken in the specification of the model form when these procedures are used since the 
parameter estimates derived from the model are contingent on the form. Model specification 
requires a firm a priori understanding of the underlying processes generating the time-series data 
and the model specification frequently leads to controversy. With respect to M&A, the 
hypothesized relationship often conflicts even when researchers are looking at similar 
relationships (Hayward, 2003; Finkelstein and Hablian, 2002) due to the presence of seemingly 
complex error structures and delayed effects of learning. 
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Under the conditions outlined in previous research efforts and upon which this study is modeled, 
the investigator was concerned with understanding why some firms outperform others in M&A 
activity and hypothesized that the occurrence was due to learning from previous acquisition 
experience. The strategy that is taken is to record the number of acquisitions that have taken 
place until the focal acquisition (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Porini, 2004). 
Presumably, those firms with more prior acquisitions would outperform firms with fewer. One 
indicator of learning is the amount of time between previous and focal events. In this example, 
the dependent variable is an indicator of time elapsed between events: ti. In addition to collecting 
data about the duration of time, exogenous variables theorized to influence ti may be collected. 
To test the hypothesis, the impact of the exogenous variables on t could be estimated from the 
regression:  
    (5) 
where the  is a matrix of exogenous variables and associated parameters and  is a random 
error disturbance (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). Although this method is conceivable, 
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) found that there are two problems associated with this 
method: right-censoring and time-varying covariates. 
Traditional methods of analysis of these data series have utilized an OLS model of the form: 
   (6) OLS Regression Equation 
where  and  are regression coefficients, and   is a stochastic disturbance. Included in this 
study are the traditional OLS models in order to evaluate the findings from this model with 
respect to the findings of the ARIMA model. However, it is recognized that significance tests of 
OLS regression estimates assume non-autocorrelation of the error terms; i.e. at sequential points 
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in the series, they should be randomly distributed. Additionally, it is assumed that the mean of 
the error terms should be zero and the variance constant throughout the time series. When the 
value in the datum in time t1 is dependent upon the value of the datum in time t, as is the case 
with q and CAR, a dependency exists that links the error terms and the non-autocorrelation 
assumption is violate. The effect is that the OLS estimates appear far better than they actually are 
leading to the assumption that significant relationships exist where they may not. The Durbin-
Watson test is the standard test for autocorrelation. However, Dezhbakhsh (1990) found that the 
Durbin-Watson test is often performs poorly in models with more than one lag of the dependent 
variable. 
Under the preceding situation, an ideal methodology appears to be the transfer function model of 
Box and Jenkins (1976) (Adams and Moriarty, 1981) applied to a time series analysis. Time 
series analysis is a chronological sequence of observations corresponding to the variable under 
study and is based on the assumption that past behavior can be used to predict future behavior 
(Saaty and Vargas, 1990). In economic time series analysis, the researcher often works with 
models where it is necessary to include lagged values of the independent variables to make the 
model realistic (Edlund, 1984). If, as in this study, the researcher wants to investigate the 
relationship between prior and focal acquisitions, it is reasonable to assume that the focal activity 
will be affected not only by the current actions but also by the learning that took place in 
previous events; this kind of relationship can be included in the transfer function models 
described by Box and Jenkins [B-J] (1976). The advantage of the transfer function modeling is 
that it offers a systematic technique and empirically based set of steps that eliminate from the 
consideration a large number of potential model specifications; regression and econometric 
models cannot make the same claim. 
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Suppose that a researcher has access to a dependent (the firm‟s Q-ratio) time series, Yt, and 
another (M&A announcements) time series, Xt, measured contemporaneously with Zt. It is 
reasonable to suspect that the two series are functionally related, a general form of a distributed 
lag relationship could be written using the following notation: 
    (7) 
where Zt is described by a weighted sum of the current and lagged values of X. The values appear 
at time lags 0, 1, 2,…, l, with weights β0, β1, …, βl.  is random error, usually assumed 
independent and normally distributed, with mean zero and constant variance. A distributed lag 
model takes for granted that a stimulus (M&A) evokes a full effect only after the passage of time 
and that the full effect is not felt in the same period in which the stimulus occurs. Since there are 
lags between learning and subsequent M&A performance, it is intuitively appealing to measure 
acquisition experience effects in this manner. 
Specifications of a unique form of equation (7) for a given setting are conditioned upon the 
researcher‟s orientation. Typically, researchers who follow a regression or an econometric 
epistemology specify alternative model forms, usually by specifying restrictions on the β‟s. 
These alternative model forms are then tested empirically against appropriate data and the model. 
In the estimation process, serially correlated errors are often detected. While methods exist for 
dealing with autocorrelation, one is often uncertain whether the observed autocorrelation is 
confounded with the structural part of the model. Furthermore, procedures that may “solve” the 
autocorrelation problem (such as using the first differences of the variables in a regression 
model) may also tend to reduce the ability of the data to provide the researchers with meaningful 
information about the nature of the relationships of interest. 
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An alternative approach to identification of equation (7) is to begin with the premise that the 
autocorrelation structure of a time series represents an intrarelationship within the series. The 
important task in identification of time-series relationships is to remove the intrarelationship 
(serial correlation) within the series prior to determining their interrelationships. This is the 
transfer-function methodology insofar as identification of the relationships is concerned (Adams 
and Moriarty, 1981; Pack, 1977).  
3.8.1. ARIMA and Transfer Function Models 
An autoregressive, moving average (ARIMA) model has the form (Saaty and Vargas, 1990): 
. (8) 
The order of an ARIMA model is usually denoted by the notation ARIMA (p,d,q) where p is the 
order of the autoregressive part; d is the order of the differencing; and, q is the order of the 
moving average process.  
The use of univariate models for description and prediction of economic time series has been 
criticized by econometricians because the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models could 
be used without understanding the underlying economic system and because ARMA models 
could not be used to predict future values of a series when the system has been „shocked‟ 
(Edlund, 1984). As mentioned above, the B-J TF may be used to overcome the objection 
presented by the economists. The TF model resembles ordinary regression models but has the 
advantage of an explicit noise model which allows the residuals to be autocorrelated. The basic 
TF model with on independent variable, Xt, may be split into two components following Jenkins 
(1979): 
     (9) 
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where, yt is the dependent variable (suitably differenced / transformed to be mean and variance 
stationary), ut contains that part of yt which can be explained exactly in terms of xt (suitably 
differenced / transformed to be mean and variance stationary) and  is an error term which 
represents all the „missing‟ x variables plus the pure noise.  
The relationship between xt and ut can be expressed by a linear dynamic relationship of the kind: 
  (10) 
solving for  
  (11) 
where 
     (12) 
B is the ordinary lag operator,  is a „moving average‟ operator,  is an „autoregressive‟ 
operator, and b is a pure delay parameter that represents the number of complete time intervals 
before change in  begins to have an effect on . 
The transfer function  is a rational lag structure that may represent any form of dynamic 
relationship between xt and yt to any specified degree of accuracy (Edlund, 1984). In general, one 
might use differently differenced input and output variables.  may be replaced by the 
ARMA (p,q) model of the form: 
    (13) 
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where  is an autoregressive operator (AR),  is a moving average operator (MA) and at 
represents the white noise series. If  is removed between (12) and (13), the TF-noise model 
is derived: 
    (14) 
Where there is more than one independent variable, m variables x2t,…,xmt, (14) is easily 
generalized to: 
   (15) 
Additionally, it is possible to add a seasonal component to the series. It is also clear that ordinary 
regression models are a special case of the more general (15). 
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4. RESULTS 
Figure 3 illustrates the average q over the five year period from one month before the 
announcement of the event to 5-years. A simple regression model with a polynomial trend line 
with fifth order appears to fit the data well. The average q of all firms and activities is plotted as 
the center polynomial trend line and is represented by diamonds. What is interesting to note 
about this is that although there are some differences between industries as to the overall 
measure  
 
Figure 3: Sample Simple Regressions of q 
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of q, the overall trend line appears to demonstrate similar qualities. Intuitively, this makes sense. 
One month prior to the acquisition announcement, the firm has a slightly lower q-ratio that rises 
slightly around the announcement period. One might account for this trend due to several factors. 
The first is that the stock price might see an initial rise in value. Second, the organization‟s debt 
structure (in the numerator of the q calculation) changes; i.e. it increases in order to fund the 
activity. The effect is that the inputs to the numerator in the calculation increase at a faster rate 
around the announcement than the increase in total assets. This supports, at least anecdotally, a 
claim that the acquirer does gain profits around the announcement period for at least a few days 
after the announcement. However, within a week of the announcement to merge, the line 
regresses to the mean. 
Furthermore, the trend line supports claims that it takes longer than the short-term time that CAR 
examines in order to determine the success of an acquisition, at least from the perspective of the 
acquirer. On average, it does not appear that a firm begins to realize gains from the acquisition 
until sometime after 3 years at which point the q begins to trend up. With respect to SIC 28, the 
trend up has not yet begun, which supports some claims that M&A may take even longer than 
five years. 
In this section, findings from both the OLS and ARIMA models are presented; section 4.1, 
presents the OLS results for both CAR and q; section 4.2 presents the ARIMA results for both 
dependent measures; finally, in 4.3, a comparison of the two models is discussed. 
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4.1. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) 
4.1.1. CAR 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statics and correlations for the variables used in the study with 
respect to CAR as the dependent variable. Note that the results for CAR at both the 3 and 11-day 
periods were similar. Therefore, only the 11-day period is presented here.     
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Table 3: Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlations CAR 1-week  
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1  CAR 11-days 0.00 0.08 1.000              
2  Firm size (Z) 2.92 0.93 -0.002 1.000             
3  Firm performance 4.06 10.97 -0.001 0.453** 1.000            
4  Contested bid 0.02 0.14 0.011 0.018 -0.006 1.000           
5 Foreign bid 0.15 0.36 0.033* 0.280** 0.115** 0.019 1.000          
6  Business similarity 0.24 0.89 0.035* -0.075** -0.020 -0.009 -0.005 1.00         
7  Relative deal size 14.06 207.59 0.013 0.053** 0.037* 0.098** -0.018 -0.014 1.00        
8  Method of payment 0.23 0.42 0.030 0.071** 0.026 -0.017 0.085** -0.018 -0.026 1.00       
9  Use of advisor 0.47 0.50 -0.067** 0.214** 0.069** 0.060** -0.028 -0.059** 0.048** -0.030 1.00      
10 Acquisition experience 4.79 6.78 0.014 0.251** 0.253** -0.026 0.013 0.124** 0.056** -0.068** 0.136 1.00     
11 Similarity of antecedent 
acquisitions 
20.35 33.41 0.018 -0.050** -0.059** 0.013 0.011 0.268** -0.018 0.004 0.010 -0.148** 1.00    
12 Small acquisition losses 1.51 2.10 -0.026 0.235** 0.219** -0.022 -0.045* 0.017 0.046** -0.046** 0.132** 0.788** -0.159** 1.00   
13 Timing of antecedent 
acquisitions (log) 
2.94 0.45 -0.012 -0.266** -0.104** -0.010 -0.069** -0.030 -0.023 0.068** -0.018 -0.468** 0.126** -0.421** 1.00  
14 Timing of focal 
acquisitions 
2.98 0.82 -0.016 -0.239** -0.106** -0.002 -0.045* -0.004 -0.017 0.070 -0.008 -0.420** 0.140** -0.365** 0.793*0* 1.000 
 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01   (N = 2622) 
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This table has several points worth noting. First, the mean for business similarity is .24 which 
signifies that 24 percent of previous acquisitions share the same 4-digit SIC code as a current 
acquisition
13
. Second, the correlation between acquisition experience and acquisition 
performance is positive and significant which provides support for Hypothesis 1 but differs from 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) who found a negative relationship and Hayward (2002) who 
found no relationship. Given the variation in findings between the three studies, this suggests that 
the methodology may not be appropriate and might warrant an alternative modeling. Likewise, it 
may be due to the dependent variable that was selected. Finally, similarity of antecedent 
acquisitions is negative and significant; again differing form Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
and Hayward (2002) who both found positive relationship, but that may be accounted for by 
differences in samples. 
Since the data is cross-sectional and in-line with previous research, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses for both CAR and q is developed. Therefore, firms that 
made more than one acquisition between 1991 and 2005 will appear more than once in the 
sample. Although the previous studies did not compute the Durbin-Watson statistic for 
autocorrelation, and despite the concerns raised by Dezhabakhsh (1990), a test for the statistic 
was used. For this study the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.846, which suggests that 
autocorrelation was not a problem and is consistent with previous findings (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). Table 4, model 1 includes the control variable. For announcement returns, 
this model yielded an R-square of 0.004 (see Table 5) which suggests that little variance of the 
model is accounted for 
                                                 
13
 This number is 19 percent higher than what Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) found but may be accounted for by 
both the larger sample size and the fact that my study is more inclusive of firms. 
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Table 4: Acquisition Experience Analysis 
Dependent variable: CAR (11-days) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant     
 -0.132 -0.263 0.027 0.428 
Firm size (z) 0.001
**
 0.001
*
 0.000
**
 -0.063
**
 
 0.044 0.062 -0.016 -1.897 
Firm performance -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 0.022 
 -0.237 -0.318 -0.375 0.877 
Contested bid 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 0.712 0.708 0.688 0.754 
Foreign bid 0.029 0.029 0.024 0.027 
 1.397 1.419 1.153 1.227 
Business similarity 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.022 
 1.443 1.444 0.981 1.030 
Relative acquisition size 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.010 
 0.779 0.799 0.820 0.511 
Method of payment (cash=1) 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.026 
 1.448 1.459 1.529 1.266 
Use of advisor -0.068
***
 -0.068
***
 -0.069
***
 -0.057
**
 
 -3.348 -3.357 -3.371 -2.629 
Acquisition experience 0.018
*
 0.037
*
 0.138
**
 0.177
***
 
 0.452 0.746 2.235 2.683 
Similarity of prior acquisitions 0.005
** 
-0.019
*
 -0.057
*
 -0.079
*
 
 0.126 -0.357 -1.021 -1.351 
Squared term of similarity of prior acquisitions  0.018
*
 0.025
*
 -0.040 
 0.649 0.332 -0.515 
Small acquisition losses   -0.094
***
 0.088
**
 
   -2.826 1.045 
Timing of prior acquisitions (natural log)   0.003
**
 0.009
*
 
   0.089 0.367 
Squared term of timing of prior acquisitions 
(natural log) 
   0.011
**
 
   0.106 
Timing of focal acquisition (natural log)   -0.013
**
 -0.100
***
 
   -0.393 -2.835 
Squared term of timing of focal acquisition 
(natural log) 
   0.054
**
 
   0.608 
n 2622 2622 2622 2622 
R squared 0.004
**
 0.004 0.010 0.186
****
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****F < 0.01 
*Standardized coefficients reported with standard errors under. Dummy variables for years not shown. 
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by the control variables. However, both use of advisor and firm size had significant effects on 
announcement returns. When the model includes the number, nature, time and performance of 
antecedent acquisition activities, the R-square only increased to 0.186 (see model 4 of Table 5). 
The additional contribution to R square was 0.0, 0.01, and 0.176 for the similarity and size of 
previously acquired businesses, small acquisition losses, and timing of acquisitions respectively. 
Model 5 examines the effects of the experience variables when experience is discounted that did 
not account for additional variance in acquisition performance for either measures of 
performance and therefore is omitted from the report.  For the relationship between experience 
and acquisition performance, hypothesis 1 predicted a curvilinear relationship. Like Hayward 
(2002), a squared term of the acquisition experience variable is included to test H1 and test the 
nature of the relationship. Like Hayward (2002) but different form Haleblian and Finkelstein 
(1999), no evidence to support a U-shaped relationship was found. Therefore, no claim of 
support for H1 using CAR as the dependent variable and OLS as the methodology can be made.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship between the similarity of antecedent 
and focal performance. The test for this involved the inclusion of both a main effect and a 
squared term for the variables. When CAR is the dependent variable, the main effect yielded a 
negative and significant coefficient (p < 0.05) and the squared term yielded a positive but 
insignificant coefficient. Hence, the results yield a pattern opposite of what was expected for the 
findings of H2 and dissimilar to Hayward‟s (2002) study that suggests an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. In fact, this study suggests a U-shaped relationship. However, since the squared 
term is insignificant, the results may point to a linear negative relationship which suggests that as 
firms diversify more, performance decreases. The negative, linear relationship supports the 
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business concentration hypothesis that argues that firms that stick to a single line of business 
outperform those that over diversify.  
Using the definition of small acquisition losses as prior deals that resulted in recorded 
announcement depreciation of 3%, the sample, on average, had less than one instance. The 
presence of a small acquisition loss as an antecedent condition had a positive (0.088) and 
significant (p < 0.05 in model 4). This would suggest that the greater the number of small losses, 
the greater the focal performance would be. These results are previous to similar findings and 
supports H3. 
With respect to the effects of timing on acquisition experience, H4a predicted an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the time between antecedent activities and the focal acquisition‟s 
performance. To model H4A, the time of prior acquisitions variable, as well as its squared term, 
was included in the model. Support of the hypothesis will be support if the directionality of the 
sign from the term to the square changes. H4A was not supported by the data at the 0.1 
significance level. The findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between timing or 
prior and focal acquisitions but only slightly. With respect to H4b, the findings produced by the 
sample data suggest a U-shaped relationship between the timing or the focal acquisition and the 
prior, which supports H4b, which differs from Hayward‟s (2002) study. Both the focal variable 
and the square term were significant (p < 0.05). Hayward (2002) found that when he portioned 
his sample into quartiles for relative size, the findings did not hold for large acquisitions which 
demonstrated a positive relationship between acquisition timing and performance.  
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4.1.2. Tobin’s q-ratio 
Table 6 presents the fractiles of the q variable as it relates to the pilot study and is presented in 
order to illustrate the variation in q over the measurement period. At the bottom of table 5, 
Smirlock et al.‟s (1984) findings are presented as a comparison between the pilot study and 
previous results. Notice that there is some difference in overall findings between the two but that 
the pilot study is within expected range. Variation between these results and Smirlock et al 
(1984) may be accounted for by both the limited size of the current study and the time period 
within which the data was collected. Although the maximum score of 143.11 reported in  
Table 5 may appear extreme, but it is not out of the range of possible results, although it does 
represent an extreme case. The maximum score was earned by a firm in the machine and 
equipment industry (SIC Code 35; see Appendix A). In particular, the firm designs ‟smart„ 
material handling systems, which require a knowledge-based production function and which one 
would expect to have higher q-ratios given the relatively lower amount of assets (denominator of 
the measure) and typically higher level of „intangible‟ capabilities captured in the stock returns 
  
Table 5: Fractiles for  q-ratio     Fractiles of the Sample Distribution of the Statistic 
  Mean SD Min 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 Max 
Announcement Date - 1 Month 1.15 2.57 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.79 1.30 2.03 71.53 
Announcement Date - 1 Week 1.15 2.60 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.79 1.27 2.01 74.25 
Announcement Date 1.14 2.62 0.00 0.18 0.30 0.79 1.29 2.01 76.95 
Announcement Date + 1 Week 1.14 2.58 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.80 1.29 2.01 73.35 
Announcement Date + 2 Years 0.98 2.77 0.00 0.19 0.29 0.70 1.13 1.72 117.98 
Announcement Date + 3 Years 0.88 1.78 0.00 0.20 0.28 0.63 1.13 1.64 65.98 
Announcement Date + 5 Years 0.96 3.30 0.00 0.21 0.29 0.63 1.16 1.69 143.11 
Smirlock et al (1984) 2.30 1.62 0.82 1.14 1.30 1.69 2.79 4.43 11.17 
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and debt structure. Furthermore, although we would not expect to see negative q-ratios, it is not 
unheard of and represents a surplus of current assets relative to current and long-term debt
14
. In 
Appendix C, the industry adjusted q-ratios, ranked on average for the one month prior to 
announcement period. The total data set, as mentioned above, contained 2622 acquisition events 
in the 54 industries presented in Tables 17, 18, 19, and 20 of Appendix C. Of note is that 4 of the 
acquisition events in three industries did not have sufficient information to calculate their q-
ration over the entire five year period and were therefore omitted from the q measure. Where 
available, the tables in Appendix C present a comparison to Lindenberg and Ross‟ (1981) study 
with their q-ration and ranks presented in the far right column.  Although no analysis was 
conducted to compare the result between this pilot study and the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) 
study, the difference is presumably accounted for by sample differences. Comparisons between 
the findings here and Lindenberg and Ross‟ are presented to illustrate the similarity in findings 
(order of magnitude similarities) and a rough comparison of results.  
Like the data for CAR, the data for q are cross-sectional. Therefore, OLS regression analysis to 
test the hypotheses for q was used with controls for year and industry. Again, the Durbin-Watson 
(D-W) test for autocorrelation was conducted. The lowest D-W was for the model containing 
Year 3 (1.94); the highest value was for year 5 (2.01). The D-W results suggest that 
autocorrelation was not a problem and is consistent with previous findings (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). Table 10 illustrates that there is a strong and significant correlation between q 
at the 2, 3, and 5 year periods. Furthermore, the results of the various models were similar. 
                                                 
14
 A possible adjustment for this phenomenon is to take the absolute value of the debt which will adjust for the 
negative number and return a relative q-value equitable to the others. Although this was not conducted for the pilot 
study, it will be investigated in the full data set. 
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Presented are the findings for q at 11-days for comparison to CAR and at 3 years – the 
approximate point that average q turns up from losses as illustrated in Figure 3. 
In Table 7 and Table 8 for q at 1 week and 3 years respectively, model 1 includes the control 
variables. For q, this model yielded an R-square of 0.008 (1 week) and 0.013 (3 years). When the 
model includes the number, nature, time, and performance of antecedent acquisition activities, 
the R-square increased to 0.196 (model 4, 1 week) and 0.069 (model 4, 3 years). The additional 
contribution to R square was 0.000, 0.002, and 0.03 (3-years); for 1 week, the change to each 
model was 0.000, 0.002, and 0.185 for the similarity and size of previously acquired businesses, 
small acquisition losses, and timing of acquisitions respectively. Around the announcement time, 
the overall model fit for q and CAR are similar while for 3-years the model fit reduces 
significantly, which suggests that merely regressing the independent variables on performance in 
the short-run is not sufficient to predict long-term performance of a firm from market reaction to 
M&A announcement.  
For the relationship between experience and acquisition performance, H1q predicted a positive 
relationship between q and antecedent experience. Table 6 and Table 8 illustrate a negative, 
significant relationship between q and experience (p < 0.05) that rejects to H1q. The results 
provided in modeling focal acquisition experience with respect to the „learning by doing‟ 
theorem using OLS would reject previous assumptions that a firm is capable at getting better at 
M&A simply by conducting M&A activity.  
H2q predicted a positive relationship between the similarity of antecedent and focal performance. 
The test for this involved the inclusion of both a main effect and a squared term for the variables. 
When q is the dependent variable, the main effect yielded a positive, non-significant coefficient 
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Table 6: Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlations q 1-week  
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
q 3-Years 1.14 2.58 1.000                           
Firm size (Z) 2.92 0.93 0.001 1.000                         
Firm performance 4.07 10.98 -0.002 0.453* 1.000                       
Contested bid 0.02 0.14 0.003 0.018 -0.006 1.000                     
Foreign bid 0.15 0.36 0.047** 0.280** 0.115** 0.019 1.000                   
Business similarity 0.24 0.89 0.011 -0.075** -0.020 -0.009 -0.005 1.000                 
Relative deal size 14.06 207.63 0.009 0.053** 0.037* 0.098** -0.018 -0.014 1.000               
Method of payment 0.23 0.42 0.024 0.071** 0.026 -0.017 0.085** -0.018 -0.026 1.000             
Use of advisor 0.47 0.50 -0.060** 0.214** 0.069** 0.060** -0.027 -0.059** 0.048** -0.029 1.000           
Acq experience 4.79 6.78 -0.042* 0.251** 0.253** -0.026 0.012 0.124** 0.056** -0.068 0.137** 1.000         
Similarity of antecedent acq 2.55 3.62 -0.042* 0.086** 0.092** -0.028 0.001 0.181** 0.049** -0.081** 0.040* 0.844** 1.000       
Small acq losses 1.51 2.10 -0.054** 0.235** 0.218** -0.022 -0.045* 0.017 0.046** -0.046** 0.132** 0.788** 0.594** 1.000     
Timing of antecedent acq 
(log) 
7.20 7.07 -0.008 -0.207** -0.082** -0.013 -0.065** -0.009 -0.012 0.080** -0.007 -0.330** -0.309** -0.304** 1.000   
Timing of focal acq 7.00 7.18 -0.005 -0.201** -0.076** -0.010 -0.051** 0.003 -0.010 0.090** -0.001 -0.312** -0.301** -0.277** 0.867** 1.000 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01      (N = 2621) 
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Table 7: Acquisition Experience Analysis with q 
Dependent variable: Tobin's q-ratio (1-Week) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant     
 6.62 6.69 6.40 12.78 
Firm size (z) 0.01 0.00 0.00
*
 -0.05 
 0.23 0.20 0.05 -1.50 
Firm performance 0.00
**
 0.00
**
 0.00 0.01 
 -0.05 0.08 0.16 0.57 
Contested bid 0.00 0.00 0.00
**
 0.00
**
 
 0.15 0.16 0.09 -0.05 
Foreign bid 0.04
**
 0.04
**
 0.04
**
 -0.04
**
 
 2.08 2.04 1.77 -1.96 
Business similarity 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 0.79 0.79 0.27 -0.54 
Relative acquisition size 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.17 
Method of payment (cash=1) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
*
 
 0.78 0.76 0.83 -0.12 
Use of advisor -0.06 -0.06
***
 -0.05
***
 -0.01 
 -2.80 -2.78 -2.66 -0.60 
Acquisition experience -0.01
***
 -0.04 0.01 0.02 
 -0.17 -0.75 0.21 0.29 
Similarity of prior acquisitions -0.04 0.00
*
 -0.01 -0.02
**
 
 -0.95 0.03 -0.19 -0.32 
Squared term of similarity of prior 
acquisitions 
 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
 -1.04 0.33 1.05 
Small acquisition losses   -0.05 -0.02 
   -1.59 -0.63 
Timing of prior acquisitions (natural log)   -0.04 0.00
**
 
   -1.23 -0.02 
Squared term of timing of prior acquisitions 
(natural log) 
   -0.04 
    -0.39 
Timing of focal acquisition (natural log)   0.00
**
 0.04 
   0.09 0.54 
Squared term of timing of focal acquisition 
(natural log) 
   -0.02 
   -0.22 
N 2621 2621 2621 2620 
R squared 0.008**** 0.008**** 0.011**** 0.196**** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****F < 0.01 
*Standardized coefficients reported with standard errors under. Dummy variables not shown. 
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Table 8: Acquisition Experience Analysis with q 
Dependent variable: Tobin's q-ratio (3-years) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant .883 .878 .971 .095 
 6.527 6.340 5.737 .074 
Firm size (z) .014 .014 .018 -.024 
 .556 .561 .695 -.692 
Firm performance .003
*
 .002
*
 .003 .006 
 .119 .097 .138 .225 
Contested bid .005 .005 .005 -.008 
 .252 .251 .230 -.394 
Foreign bid .083
***
 .083
***
 .081
***
 .034 
 3.856 3.858 3.741 1.520 
Business similarity .027 .027 .030 .008 
 1.286 1.284 1.393 .347 
Relative acquisition size .022 .022 .022 .012 
 1.074 1.078 1.073 .598 
Method of payment (cash=1) .019 .019 .018 -.003 
 .898 .899 .858 -.156 
Use of advisor -.072
***
 -.072
***
 -.067
***
 -.017 
 -3.370 -3.372 -3.114 -.781 
Acquisition experience -.048 -.044 -.065 -.065 
 -1.139 -.836 -.997 -.947 
Similarity of prior acquisitions .004
*
 -.001
**
 -.115 .029 
 .106 -.024 -1.465 .479 
Squared term of similarity of prior acquisitions  .004 .109 .033 
  .147 1.461 .414 
Small acquisition losses   .010 .034 
   .292 .948 
Timing of prior acquisitions (natural log)   -.027 -.059 
   -.797 -.557 
Squared term of timing of prior acquisitions 
(natural log)    
.031 
    .293 
Timing of focal acquisition (natural log)   .004
*
 .056 
   .121 .735 
Squared term of timing of focal acquisition 
(natural log)    
-.046 
    -.549 
          
n 2368 2368 2368 2368 
R squared 0.008**** 0.008**** 0.011**** 0.196**** 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****F < 0.01 
*Standardized coefficients reported with standard errors under. Dummy variables not shown. 
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Table 9: Means, Standard Deviation and Correlations q 3-years 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
q 3-years 0.88 1.78 1.00              
Firm size (Z) 2.92 0.93 0.01 1.00             
Firm performance 4.06 10.97 0.00 0.453** 1.00            
Contested bid 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00           
Foreign bid 0.15 0.36 0.091** 0.280** 0.115** 0.02 1.00          
Business similarity 0.24 0.89 0.02 -0.075** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00         
Relative deal size 14.06 207.59 0.02 0.053** 0.04 .098** -0.02 -0.01 1.00        
Method of payment 0.23 0.42 0.03 0.071** 0.03 -0.02 0.085** -0.02 -0.03 1.00       
Use of advisor 0.47 0.50 -0.079** 0.214** 0.069** 0.060** -0.03 -.059** .048* -0.03 1.00      
Acq experience 4.79 6.78 -0.047* 0.251** 0.253** -0.03 0.01 0.124** .056** -0.068** 0.136** 1.00     
Similarity of 
antecedent 
acquisitions 
2.55 3.62 -0.03 0.086** 0.092** -0.03 0.00 0.181** 0.049* -0.080** 0.039* 0.844** 1.00    
Small acqlosses 0.15 0.50 -0.03 0.129** 0.060** -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.042* -0.02 0.071** 0.362** 0.261** 1.00   
Timing of antecedent 
acq (log) 
6.76 1.03 0.01 -0.280** -0.109** 0.00 -.051** -0.051** -0.03 0.053** -0.03 -0.605** -0.517** -0.205** 1.00  
Timing of focal acq 5.95 1.85 0.03 -0.200** -0.124** 0.01 -0.02 -0.044* -0.03 0.050* -0.02 -0.510** -0.495** -0.185** 0.563** 1.00 
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (N = 2368)                             
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as did the squared term (see model 4 tables 10 and 11)
15
. Hence the results yield a pattern 
opposite of what was expected for the findings and suggest a negative relationship. The results 
are counterintuitive to the market efficiency argument. Since the results from the main test using 
OLS are non-significant, no claim to support or not for the hypothesis may be made. The 
correlation as illustrated in Table 10, however, suggests a significant (p < 0.05) negative 
relationship which would reject the H2q. 
Using the same definition of small acquisition losses as prior studies, a firm that executed an 
acquisition that resulted in a recorded q depreciation of 3%, the study finds that at the 1 week 
window any given firm in the sample had, on average, 1.5 small losses (Table 6). However, at 
the 3-year window, firms experienced only 0.15 small losses (Table 9). We must not be too 
quick to read into this support that the difference between 1-week and 3-years supports claims 
that it takes about three years for firms to realize gain from their acquisition activity. In fact, 
Figure 3 illustrates what the difference between 1-week and 3-years really captures; namely, that 
after three years, there are more firms that experienced greater than „small‟ acquisition losses as 
defined here. The presence of a small acquisition loss as an antecedent condition had a positive 
but insignificant effect on focal acquisition performance. This would suggest that the greater the 
number of small losses, the greater the focal performance would be. Although the results are 
similar to previous findings, since they are not significant, the results are unable to say that there 
is support for H3. With the larger data set, the results may have greater significance. 
                                                 
15
 None of the variables demonstrated significance in Model 4 q at 3 years. 
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With respect to the effects of timing on acquisition experience, H4Aq predicted an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the time between antecedent activities and the focal acquisition‟s 
performance. Although the study did not report significant findings, the directionality of the 
signs suggests a U-shaped relationship, which is contrary to predicted. With respect to H4b, the 
findings are similar to H4Aq.  
The variation in findings between the various studies (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002) suggests support that the OLS methodology is 
inappropriate to the data that we are attempting to model. If the theories held up to testing we 
would expect to see more similar findings that have been reported in the literature. Therefore, in 
the next section, the ARIMA models of the data are presented.  
4.2. ARIMA MODEL 
In this section, report of the findings of the ARIMA models is presented. The next section 
presents the results of the ARIMA model with transfer functions for CAR. In section 4.2.2, the 
results for the ARIMA models for q are provided. 
A first order moving average process is represented by the expression: 
 
and an autoregressive process of zero is represented by the expression: 
 
Solving for (8) with non-seasonality and considering the ARIMA(0,0,1) yields the following: 
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4.2.1. CAR 
An algorithm in SPSS version 17.0 was used to determine the best specification for competing 
ARIMA models using the Expert Modeler function in the software. The ARIMA model fits and 
percentage of variance explained by each model of CAR are presented in Appendix E. The R-
squared values presented here are “interpreted in the usual way” (Hopwood and McKeown, 
1981). However, one should use caution when interpreting the R-squared since it represents the 
percentage of variation explained on the series as modeled. The Ljung-Box Q (L-B) statistics for 
e at both the three day and one week period are presented in Table 27. The L-B test may be 
stated as such: 
H0: The data are random.  
Ha: The data are not random.  
Since the test is non-significant, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and therefore, the data 
appears to be random. This is an important assumption for time series models. 
The Expert Modeler function determined that the best model fit for both the 3-day and 1-week 
periods is ARIMA (0,0,0)
16
. Appendix E presents the final estimates for each of the CAR model. 
Only those independent variables that are significant are included in the final results. In Model 1, 
only prior experience needs to be differenced by 1 in order to achieve stationarity. Differencing 
is a data pre-processing step that de-trends the data to control autocorrelation and achieve 
stationarity by subtracting each datum in a series from its predecessor. Single differencing is 
used to de-trend linear trends. 
                                                 
16
 A more detailed example of the meaning of the model is presented in the next section. 
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Tests for the hypotheses were run in a similar way as using OLS. In model 2, there was no 
significance for any of the hypotheses. With respect to the 1 week period around the time of the 
announcement, the only thing that this study can say is that relative acquisition size influences 
acquisition performance with a lag of 2. One would interpret this to mean that the current 
acquisition‟s relative size will not be felt for 2 more iterations. In model one, there is support for 
the H1 (p < 0.02). Not included in the findings here is the squared term for experience that 
allowed for the modeling of the curvilinear relationship. What is particularly interesting is that 
the evidence suggests that not only is there a curvilinear relationship between source and target 
problem but also there is a lag (8 iterations) in the realization of the relationship. This suggests 
that the influences on the target problem will not be realized for eight more acquisitions. 
Although a timer-series analysis can be coded based on the calendar time of the announcements 
and performance, this study is interested in the linear progression (count) of activities. Time is 
included as a variable in the model to test H4a and b. However, since the research is concerned 
with the series, „time‟ is coded as a series count. Therefore, where the model includes a ‟lag„, it 
cannot be interpreted as a day, year or other time period; rather, this must be interpreted as the 
next or previous (delay or lag) acquisition. In Appendix EError! Reference source not found., 
indings suggest that H3 is rejected for the 3 day period (see Table 28). H3 predicted an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between source similarity and target business on focal performance. In 
fact, the findings predict a positive relationship (p < 0.01) with a delay of 5. 
While modeling for small losses over the three day period did not support H3 for the three-day 
window, small losses over the 11-day period did support H3 for Model 1 (p < 0.01) with a lag of 
3. Therefore, for Model 2 it is still claimed that results are inconclusive, but for model 1 the 
results support H3. This supports the case of negative transfer acts. The underlying mechanism is 
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that organizations that experience a small loss look for deeper structures attributable to the loss 
in order to improve performance in their operations for the next event. The act of encoding and 
ensuring understanding will result in better organizational routines with respect to acquisitions. 
There are no statistics reported for timing, and therefore, no claims may be made for support of 
H4a or b. The next section presents the results for the ARIMA model for q. Additionally, all 
transfer functions are presented in Appendix E. 
4.2.2. TOBIN’S Q-RATIO 
As with CAR, an algorithm in SPSS version 17.0 is used to determine the best specification of 
competing ARIMA models using the Expert Modeler function in the software. The ARIMA 
model fits, and percentages of variance explained by each model are presented in Appendix D. 
As an example of how to interpret the model, Model 6 (the results of M&A 5 years after the 
announcement as measured by the firm‟s q-ratio) is best specified by ARIMA(0,0,1). 
ARIMA(0,0,1) has an autoregressive component (0), integrated component (0), and a moving 
average component (1) (see Table 20, Appendix D). Therefore, in order to predict the AR 
component, the focal acquisition is only dependent upon itself whereas to predict the MA portion 
of the model looks back to the previous acquisition experience. None of the L-B were significant 
(see Table 20, Appendix D). Therefore, all of the models appear to contain random data. 
Although it would be possible to go through each of the models and therefore, time periods 
individually, only those parts that answer the hypotheses in general (not for each year) are 
presented. However, it is interesting that in many cases, the various models contain different 
transfer functions that suggest varying modalities to manage M&A activity. In fact, in many of 
the models, the CAR is significant to the performance and learning associated with q. This 
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suggests that although firm makes decisions about the direction of the organization in order to 
achieve its goals, it does not do so without feedback from the stockholders. Additionally, Foreign 
Bid was significant in all but one of the models. The influence of Foreign Bid may be due to the 
impact it has on the perceived price of the acquisition, thereby driving up the expense of the 
acquisition. 
There are no statistics reported here that would suggest support of H1. Therefore, the results 
remain inconclusive. In retrospect, the reason that there may be now significance in findings for 
experience may be due to how „previous‟ experience and hence learning is defined in the study. 
H2 is supported in both Models 2 and 3 (p < 0.01). Both Models 2 and 3 are short-term measures 
(q at 1 day and 1 week) which suggest that similarity of business is important in the short run but 
that the significance diminishes over time. Small losses in a variety of formats and models 
display significance which suggests that small losses are watched throughout the M&A process. 
Small losses in most models exhibit a Delay of 3 which suggests that the loss feeds forward, not 
backward. H3 is supported. 
Only Model 2 (q 1-day) demonstrates significance for the timing variables. However, results in 
Model 2 suggest, tentatively, support for H4a but not for H4b. Therefore, hypothesis H4b which 
states that there is a positive relationship between timing of previous experience and target 
acquisition is not supported.  
4.3. COMPARISON OF CAR & Q 
Table 10 presents the correlations between CAR at both the 3 and 11-day periods and q at all 
measured periods. There is a significant (p < 0.01) relationship between CAR and q in the short-
term which is to be expected since the only change to the measurement of q is the change in 
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stock prices. Although the relationship between q and CAR in the short-term is significant, the 
strength of the relationship is not very strong. Therefore, one might state that there is no 
difference in either the use of CAR or q, and given the ease of calculating CAR, it is more 
efficient to use this as a proxy for performance of the acquisition. However, in the long-term, 
both the significance and the relationship diminish, which suggests that CAR is not a good proxy 
for the long-term performance of the acquisition. 
Table 10: Pearson Correlation - q and CAR 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 
e3D 0.002 0.067 1        
e11D -0.001 0.084 0.785
**
 1       
QANNC 1.145 2.615 0.015 0.010 1      
Q1D 1.213 3.195 0.040
*
 0.046
*
 0.834
**
 1     
Q1W 1.145 2.582 0.020 0.025 0.998
**
 0.834
**
 1    
Q2Y 0.976 2.769 0.039 0.027 0.189
**
 0.148
**
 0.197
**
 1   
Q3Y 0.884 1.785 0.039 0.037 0.480
**
 0.459
**
 0.477
**
 0.755
**
 1  
Q5y 0.957 3.301 0.012 0.016 0.842
**
 0.795
**
 0.832
**
 0.119
**
 0.805
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 10 presents the correlations between q and CAR at each of the measurement periods with 
year controls added. The results maintain significance, but the strength of the relationship 
between q and CAR diminishes at all periods. Interesting to note, in each of the periods except 
for the 3-day, the mean was a loss of wealth. This suggests that, on average, acquisitions in this 
sample always lose value. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This work started with the assumption that merger and acquisition forms an important part of an 
organization‟s overall strategic orientation. M&A serves as one tactic in an organization‟s 
playbook that may help it to achieve focus or generalization, differentiation or cost leadership 
strategies. Additionally, M&A may help an organization maintain or gain a comparative 
advantage in an industry through investments that create barriers to entry (Greenwald and Kahn, 
2005). The foregoing is predicated on the ability of the firm to manage the M&A process 
[identify, select, negotiate, acquire, realize synergies]. 
Results presented here suggest that traditional methodologies that use CAR and OLS only 
narrowly account for the influence of antecedent events. In fact, as mentioned earlier, others 
suggest that failure to take into consideration lags in the regression model may lead to over 
estimations of both the coefficient and levels of significance. Nonetheless, researchers in the 
M&A domain within the strategy field continue to argue that traditional event study 
methodologies remain the best mechanism to uncover the mysteries of success in M&A. One 
criticism raised recently by a researcher for any method other than CAR and OLS in the conduct 
of event study methodologies for M&A activity is that there are too many „confounding‟ events 
that take place over time that make it difficult to isolate the results of the acquisition from the 
other noise (McNamara et al., 2008). Further they link event study methodology specifically to 
CAR to the exclusion of all other measurements and claim that CAR are “more appropriate 
performance measures” (McNamara et al., 2008: 120) than accounting measures. However, what 
they may not have taken into consideration is that this study has demonstrated is that there are 
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other measures (e.g. Q measure) that provide more robust understanding of the impact of M&A 
activity. Where researchers are concerned with discovering the underlying results of an action, Q 
appears to capture more than the market perception of an activity; it captures management‟s 
actions and the impact that they have. Take, for instance, the following quote by Dwight Neese, 
President and CEO of Provident Community Bank (formerly Union Financial):  
"This new corporate identity is more dynamic in nature and reflects the 
Company's broader market area. Following the recent openings of a satellite 
office in Westminster Towers and a full-service banking center in Simpsonville 
and our expected opening of a full-service banking center in Manchester Village 
in the summer, our branch network will consist of ten offices in five counties - 
Union, Laurens, Fairfield, York and Greenville. Notwithstanding the name 
change, the Company will continue to maintain all of its current offices in Union 
County and offer the same level of products, services and community service to 
its customers as it has in the past." (Neese, TheFreeLibrary.com, 2006) 
Union financial decided to change its name to more closely reflect the new strategic form that the 
company maintained after a series of acquisitions. As the CEO states, the name change reflects 
the “new corporate identity.” This, more than market reaction, is a measure of the action that a 
company takes that is not captured in the changes of stock price despite the market efficiency 
hypothesis.  
McNamara et al. (2008) raise the concern that during the years that it may take to realize 
economic profit in the form of accounting measures after an acquisition changes the product mix, 
investment strategy, management, and additional acquisitions may affect firm performance. In 
fact, when we research analogical reasoning, we necessarily want to consider these changes. One 
M&A by a firm typically reflects a series of strategic actions and it is the chain of actions that 
represent an overall strategy for the firm. If the researcher measures only the market reaction to 
an announcement, all that he or she captures is an abbreviated window that contains 1) market 
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perceptions; and, 2) a single action (the announcement) on the part of the firm and not the series 
of activities that will demonstrate proficiency in the execution of that action.  
McNamara et al.‟s “extensive review of the literature” (2008: 120) does appear to be correct in 
the statement that there are other activities that affect measures of performance past the one year 
window. In fact, Table 10 suggests that this is correct, given that there is no significant 
relationship between CAR and q for the firm past two years. This, however, does not imply that 
CAR is a better measure of performance nor does it validate that CAR captures learning or the 
ability of the firm to successfully conduct analogical transfer or reasoning. Hayward (2002) and 
others have claimed that they use an organizational learning perspective to examine how the 
nature, performance, and timing of a firm‟s source problem (previous acquisition experience) 
transfers to a target problem (selection, identification, and consummation of a focal acquisition). 
In fact, all that they have measured is the ability of the firm to learn and take action on / to 
market cues in order to maximize shareholder wealth in the short run, not firm performance. 
A summary of the findings is presented in Table 11. The findings presented here though 
tentative, suggest that further research is warranted. The preliminary results suggest that there are 
significant differences between Q and CAR over the long-term. The difference in findings 
supports claims that true performance of an acquisition may take longer than the typically 270-
day period that much research considers.  
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Table 11: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
 OLS ARIMA  OLS ARIMA 
  CAR CAR CAR3D CAR1W q q1D q3Y q 
H1 
There is a curvilinear relationship between 
antecedent acquisition experience and firm 
performance. Tentative Supported Inconclusive 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
antecedent acquisition 
experience and firm 
performance. Rejected Inconclusive 
         
H2 
There is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the similarity of the antecedent 
target business and  similarity of focal 
performance. Inconclusive Rejected Inconclusive 
There is a positive 
relationship between the 
similarity of the 
antecedent target business 
and similarity of  focal 
performance. Inconclusive 
Support for 1 
day and 1 week 
         
H3 
The greater the number of small acquisition 
losses incurred in antecedent acquisitions, 
the greater the focal performance.  Supported Supported Inconclusive 
The greater the number of 
small acquisition losses 
incurred in antecedent 
acquisitions, the greater 
the focal performance.  Inconclusive Supported 
         
H4a 
There will be a curvilinear relationship 
between time between the previous 
acquisition and the focal acquisition and 
acquisition performance. Rejected Inconclusive 
There will be a 
curvilinear relationship 
between time between the 
previous acquisition and 
the focal acquisition and 
acquisition performance. Inconclusive Tentative 
         
H4b 
There will be a curvilinear relationship 
between average time between acquisitions 
and acquisition performance.  Rejected Inconclusive 
There will be a 
curvilinear relationship 
between average time 
between acquisitions and 
acquisition performance.  Inconclusive Rejected 
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There is a variety of opportunities for future research. For instance, one area not addressed in this 
study but may provide further insight is to partition the Q data into those acquisitions that start 
above parity and those that start below. If the literature on high-Q firms acquiring low-Q firms is 
accurate, namely that it is a form of market punishment for inefficient management of resources, 
then firms above unity ought to conduct acquisitions while firms below unit ought not to engage 
in acquisition activity. Furthermore, if Q is an accurate indicator of an ability to manage 
resources, then we would expect that firms above unity will learn at a faster rate from prior 
acquisition experience, be able to acquire a large breadth of knowledge, and be able to generalize 
that knowledge across a larger domain.  
Also not conducted here was a time series analysis. Since the data contain information about 
firms that conduct multiple acquisitions over time, there may be significance to the sequence 
with which a firm conducts acquisitions. Hence a time series analysis may yield significant 
insights into the timing, pacing, and order in which the acquisitions occur. 
5.1. FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
This dissertation has only just begun to address multiple time series data and analysis as it relates 
to merger and acquisition performance. More specifically, this study has only scratched the 
surface of the impacts of analogical reasoning and organizational learning in the context of 
M&A. There is no doubt that M&A will continue to be an important tool in the development and 
execution of strategy. With respect to the organization, knowing how to manage knowledge 
gained from the process of M&A will help with the search, identification, selection, and ultimate 
integration of a future target. The success of future targets, as this study suggests, will depend on 
previous experience. As the literature on analogical reasoning and transfer suggests, experts are 
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better at identifying the structure of the target problem than novices, and therefore, where the 
target problem lacks surface cues, institutionalizing prior experience will foster better future 
performance. 
From the perspective of the stockholder, knowing that market reaction to acquisition 
announcements does not necessarily predict future performance may help mitigate market 
„irrationality‟ to announcements. Further, knowing that it may take longer than three years to 
realize synergies from portfolio development may help investors understand the nature of the 
action taken by management.  
There is still a great deal of work employing the methodology of multiple time series analysis in 
this domain that will build greater understanding. Previous research in this domain has largely 
been prohibitive due to the cost, both time and financial, that it takes to build the data set. 
Furthermore, the computational needs have previously been too great. The ability to link 
databases to near real-time feed to update the model development will greatly enhance the 
model. Where this dissertation looked at the period around the announcement, 2, 3, and 5 years, 
a more dynamic model that measures continually for at least each reported quarter from the time 
of announcement to some time out will greatly enhance findings. Where possible, building a 
model that will measure from the time of the announcement to a period of at least ten years out, 
as some have suggested is necessary for full realization, will allow the researcher to identify the 
inflection point at which the firm begins to realize a profit. 
Although others have suggested that there are too many confounding variables that will create 
„noise‟ in the data and hence make it difficult to attribute profit to the acquisition, this research 
maintains that anything that happens after the acquisition is due to or, at least, influenced by, the 
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decision to take that acquisition event. Once the event takes place, the firm is irrevocably tied to 
the events that stream from that point in time. This suggests that should a more robust series of 
data be built, a more parsimonious time series study may be built that is constructed as a true 
event study (each acquisition is marked as an „event‟ in a steam). 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF INDUSTRIES & SAMPLE SIZE 
Table 12: Sample Summary SIC 10 Through 59 
 SIC Industry Transactions 
M
in
in
g
 10 METAL MINING 5 
13 OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 108 
14 NONMETALLIC MINERALS, EXCEPT FUELS 6 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
15 
GENERAL BUILDLING CONTRACTORS 7 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
20 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 45 
21 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 2 
22 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 12 
23 APPAREL AND OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 10 
24 LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 13 
25 FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 1 
26 PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 24 
27 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 42 
28 CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 121 
29 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS 34 
30 RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 21 
31 LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 2 
32 STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS PRODUCTS 10 
33 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 28 
34 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 41 
35 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 83 
36 INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 76 
37 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 67 
38 INSTRUMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 69 
39 MISC. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 6 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s,
 
E
le
ct
ri
c,
  
  
 G
as
, 
an
d
 
S
an
it
ar
y
 S
er
v
ic
es
 
40 RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 7 
42 TRUCKING AND WAREHOUSING 7 
44 WATER TRANSPORTATION 7 
45 TRANSPORTATION BY AIR 2 
46 PIPELINES, EXCEPT NATURAL GAS 8 
47 TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 4 
48 COMMUNICATION 111 
49 ELECTRIC, GAS, AND SANITARY SERVICES 106 
W
h
o
le
sa
le
 
T
ra
d
e 
50 
WHOLESALE TRADE - DURABLE GOODS 32 
51 
WHOLESALE TRADE - NONDURABLE GOODS 28 
R
et
ai
l 
T
ra
d
e 53 EATING AND DRINKING PLACES 12 
54 GENERAL MERCHANDISE STORES 14 
56 APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES 3 
58 EATING AND DRINKING PLACES 6 
59 MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL 6 
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Table 13: Sample Summary SIC 60 Through 87 
 SIC Industry Transactions 
F
in
an
ce
, 
In
su
ra
n
ce
, 
an
d
 R
ea
l 
E
st
at
e 
60 DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 727 
61 NONDEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 24 
62 SECURITY AND COMMODITY BROKERS 42 
63 INSURANCE CARRIERS 134 
64 INSURANCE AGENTS, BROKERS, & SERVICE 4 
65 REAL ESTATE 6 
67 HOLDING AND OTHER INVESTMENT OFFICES 393 
S
er
v
ic
es
 
70 HOTELS AND OTHER LODGING PLACES 10 
72 PERSONAL SERVICES 15 
73 BUSINESS SERVICES 47 
78 MOTION PICTURES 12 
79 AMUSEMENT & RECREATION SERVICES 7 
80 HEALTH SERVICES 6 
81 LEGAL SERVICES 4 
87 ENGINEERING & MANAGEMENT SERVICES 5 
 55 TOTALS 2622 
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APPENDIX B. MATRIX OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE THROUGH THE STUDY 
Table 14: Acquisition Experiences 1 through 39 
Sequence / 
Year 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
1 46 54 58 53 60 68 63 58 29 55 36 20 8 11 9 628 
2 14 24 23 49 43 47 56 47 23 24 21 11 5 5 7 399 
3 3 11 17 25 37 32 47 37 28 24 16 6 6 5 5 299 
4 1 3 16 20 15 26 33 34 21 17 17 10 3 6 2 224 
5 1 2 6 20 10 23 25 28 11 13 13 7 3 2 2 166 
6 0 2 3 9 13 13 20 24 20 6 7 6 2 3 1 129 
7 0 1 1 8 8 9 18 22 16 9 2 5 3 2 0 104 
8 0 1 1 6 8 4 14 19 14 11 2 4 1 1 2 88 
9 0 0 1 4 6 4 12 12 11 13 6 3 3 0 2 77 
10 0 0 1 2 6 3 8 11 11 12 4 4 2 1 1 66 
11 0 0 1 0 4 4 6 12 8 9 4 3 0 2 1 54 
12 0 0 1 0 1 6 4 9 6 6 3 2 1 2 0 41 
13 0 0 1 0 1 3 5 10 5 4 5 1 1 1 0 37 
14 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 9 4 4 5 1 1 1 1 33 
15 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 9 3 3 2 3 1 1 0 28 
16 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 8 4 1 3 2 0 1 1 24 
17 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 4 3 2 1 0 2 0 20 
18 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 3 2 0 1 1 1 1 16 
19 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 1 2 0 1 1 0 14 
20 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 1 13 
21 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 10 
22 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 9 
23 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 9 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 7 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 7 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
31 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 87 
 
Table 15: Acquisition Experiences 40 through 49 
Year / 
Sequence 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Tota
l 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
                2572 
Total 65 98 131 199 214 257 349 385 240 240 167 95 44 51 37 2572 
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APPENDIX C. INDUSTRY ADJUSTED Q-RATIOS BY SIC 
Table 16: Industry Average q-ratios SIC 10 through 29 
Two Digit SIC Industry N - 1 M - 1 W -1 D Annc + 1 D +1 W +2 Y +3 Y +5 Y L&R 
M
in
in
g
 
10 METAL MINING 5 14.64 14.31 14.23 14.26 14.34 14.60 0.17 -- -- 1.24 
13 OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 108 1.85 1.52 1.53 1.53 2.69 1.54 2.09 1.33 1.49 2.94 
14 NONMETALLIC MINERALS, 
EXCEPT FUELS 
6 1.60 1.70 1.66 1.65 1.68 1.67 1.24 1.18 1.51 
-- 
Construction 15 GEN BUILD CONTRACTORS 7 1.01 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.79 -- 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
20 FOOD & KINDRED PROD 45 2.17 1.95 1.94 1.95 1.97 1.95 1.98 1.99 2.10 1.72 
21 TOBACCO PROD 2 2.76 2.75 2.84 2.77 2.76 2.69 1.95 2.24 3.00 1.39 
22 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 12 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.74 0.75 0.63 .92 
23 APPAREL & OTHER TEXTILE 
PROD 
10 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.77 0.81 0.84 1.13 
24 LUMBER & WOOD PROD 13 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.90 0.84 1.01 1.10 1.59 
25 FURNITURE & FIXTURES 1 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.57 1.64 1.11 -- .93 
26 PAPER AND ALLIED PROD 24 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.85 0.91 1.09 
27 PRINTING & PUBLISHING 42 1.35 1.36 1.35 1.35 1.37 1.36 1.42 1.25 1.14 1.66 
28 CHEM & ALLIED PROD 121 2.33 2.29 2.28 2.28 2.32 2.28 2.27 1.92 1.64 2.42 
29 PETROLEUM & COAL PROD 34 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.96 1.39 
30 RUBBER & MISC. PLASTICS  21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.22 1.31 1.23 1.04 0.97 1.03 1.23 
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Table 17: Industry Average q-ratios SIC 30 through 48 
Two Digit SIC Industry N - 1 M - 1 W -1 D Annc + 1 D +1 W +2 Y +3 Y +5Y L&R 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
31 LEATHER AND LEATHER  2 1.70 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.71 1.49 1.45 0.47 0.78 1.66 
32 STONE, CLAY, AND GLASS  10 2.03 2.07 2.07 1.99 2.10 2.09 1.98 1.09 -0.07 1.29 
33 PRIMARY METAL IND 28 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.09 1.17 1.10 0.93 0.91 0.76 .85 
34 FABRICATED METAL  41 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.66 0.71 0.79 1.04 
35 IND MACH & EQUIP 83 1.69 1.72 1.70 1.76 1.84 1.72 0.73 1.25 3.74 1.67 
36 IND MACH & EQUIP 76 1.81 2.07 2.05 2.04 1.95 2.03 1.36 1.24 1.09 1.79 
37 TRANS EQUIPMENT 67 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06 0.90 0.89 0.91 1.17 
38 INSTRUMENTS & RELATED 
PROD 
69 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.56 1.64 1.54 1.40 1.36 1.35 3.08 
39 MISC. MAN IND 6 1.64 1.63 1.65 1.64 1.63 1.50 0.72 0.65 0.61 1.33 
40 RAILROAD 
TRANSPORTATION 
7 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.86 0.74 
-- 
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
, 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s,
 E
le
ct
ri
c,
 G
as
, 
an
d
 S
an
it
ar
y
 S
er
v
ic
es
 
42 TRUCKING AND 
WAREHOUSING 
7 3.57 4.00 3.99 3.97 3.61 3.91 1.89 2.01 6.12 
-- 
44 WATER TRANSPORTATION 7 1.87 1.91 1.92 1.92 1.93 1.94 1.45 1.16 1.12 -- 
45 TRANSPORTATION BY AIR 2 1.72 1.71 1.69 1.75 1.79 1.77 1.18 1.15 1.63 -- 
46 PIPELINES, EXCEPT NATURAL 
GAS 
8 7.77 7.89 7.91 7.96 8.14 7.97 1.42 1.25 1.17 
-- 
47 TRANSPORTATION SRV 4 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.89 1.28 1.48 1.20 -- 
48 COMMUNICATION 111 1.58 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.69 1.64 1.24 1.10 1.11 1.08 
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Table 18 : Industry Average q-ratios SIC 49 through 67 
Two Digit SIC Industry N - 1 M - 1 W -1 D Annc + 1 D +1 W +2 Y +3 Y +5Y L&R 
 49 ELECTRIC, GAS, AND 
SANITARY SERVICES 
106 1.13 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.10 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.94 
50 WHOLESALE TRADE - 
DURABLE GOODS 
32 2.70 2.72 2.74 2.64 2.65 2.65 1.21 1.10 2.57 
-- 
W
h
o
le
sa
le
 
T
ra
d
e 
51 WHOLESALE TRADE - 
NONDURABLE GOODS 
28 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.87 1.35 
53 EAT & DRINKING PLACES 12 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.02 1.00 1.04 1.02 1.42 
R
et
ai
l 
T
ra
d
e 
54 GEN MERCH STORES 14 1.50 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.51 1.48 1.16 1.21 0.82 1.23 
56 APPAREL & ACCESSORY 
STORES 
3 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.67 0.61 1.08 2.22 2.12 
-- 
58 EATING & DRINKING PL 6 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.81 0.75 -- 
59 MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL 6 1.45 1.34 1.35 1.38 1.44 1.37 1.32 1.35 0.97 1.41 
60 DEPOSITORY INST 727 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.30 -- 
F
in
an
ce
, 
In
su
ra
n
ce
, 
an
d
 R
ea
l 
E
st
at
e
 61 NONDEPOSITORY INST 24 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.51 0.58 -- 
62 SEC & COMMODITY BROKERS 42 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.45 0.48 -- 
63 INS CARRIERS 134 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.59 0.53 0.66 
-- 
64 INS AGENTS, BROKERS, & 
SRV 
4 14.58 15.13 15.10 15.07 15.10 15.67 13.01 0.23 
-- -- 
65 REAL ESTATE 6 1.33 1.39 1.37 1.34 1.42 1.32 0.87 0.78 1.00 -- 
67 HOLDING & OTR INV OFF 393 1.10 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.08 0.96 1.01 1.05 -- 
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Table 19: Industry Average q-ratios SIC 70 through 87 and Summary 
Two Digit SIC Industry N - 1 M - 1 W -1 D Annc + 1 D +1 W +2 Y +3 Y +5Y L&R 
S
er
v
ic
es
 
70 HOTELS & OTR LODGING 10 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.88 0.93 1.03 0.98 -- 
72 PERSONAL SRVS 15 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.82 0.56 -- 
73 BUSINESS SRVS 47 2.54 2.70 2.68 2.65 2.70 2.55 3.93 2.80 1.61 -- 
78 MOTION PICTURES 12 1.36 1.38 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.39 1.23 1.39 1.92 -- 
79 AMUSEMENT & REC SRVS 7 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.72 0.90 -- 
80 HEALTH SRVS 6 2.45 2.51 2.37 2.30 2.22 2.26 -- -- -- -- 
81 LEGAL SERVICES 4 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.20 1.14 -- 
87 ENG & MGNT SRVS 5 2.06 1.91 1.90 1.93 1.77 1.74 1.59 1.83 2.45 -- 
 54 TOTALS 2622 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.21 1.14 0.98 0.88 0.96  
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APPENDIX D. ARIMA MODEL AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR q 
In this appendix, the six models developed for Tobin‟s Average q-ratio are provided for each period in the study. All data was used in 
the following models. Table 20 provides the model summary information to include the Ljung-Box Q statistic. Of particular interest is 
Model_3 which has a particularly poor L-B statistic. Table 21 through Table 26 provide the full model with transfer functions for each 
of the time periods. 
Table 20: ARIMA Model Parameters for q 
  Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Model Description Model Type R-Squared Statistics DF Sig. 
Model 
ID 
qAnnc Model_1 ARIMA(0,0,0) 0.998 14.061 18 0.725 
q1D Model_2 ARIMA(0,0,0) 0.895 18.446 18 0.427 
q1W Model_3 ARIMA(1,0,12) 0.996 32.185 15 0.006 
q2Y Model_4 ARIMA(0,0,0) 0.061 11.420 18 0.876 
q3Y Model_5 ARIMA(0,0,9) 0.260 8.089 16 0.946 
q5Y Model_6 ARIMA(0,0,1) 0.728 14.450 17 0.635 
 
  
9
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Table 21: q at Announcement 
Model 
I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_1qAnnc qAnnc No Constant -0.018 0.003 -5.948 0.000 -0.018 
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 0.023 0.004 6.574 0.000 (0.023)(q1MP) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 0.381 0.021 17.904 0.000 (0.381-0.059B
2
)(q1WP) 
Lag 2 0.059 0.022 2.692 0.007  
q1DP No Numerator Lag 0 0.613 0.022 27.907 0.000  
Lag 2 -0.059 0.022 -2.681 0.007 (0.613+0.059B2)(q1WP) 
For_Bid No  Delay 6.000    (-0.018)(For_Bidt+6) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.018 0.007 -2.697 0.007  
y=(-0.018)+(0.023)(q1MP)+(0.381-0.059B
2
)(q1WP)+(0.613+0.059B
2
)(q1WP)+(-0.018)(For_Bidt+6)+αt 
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Table 22: q at One Day after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_2q1D q1D No  Constant -0.131 0.029 -4.574 0.000 -0.131 
No  Delay 2.000    (0.115)(q1Dt+2) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.115 0.042 2.753 0.006  
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 1.316 0.030 44.510 0.000 (1.316)(q1MP) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 -0.225 0.029 -7.736 0.000 (-0.225)(q1WP) 
Buss_Sim No  Delay 6.000    (0.002)(Buss_Simt+6) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.002 0.001 2.683 0.007  
e3D No Numerator Lag 0 0.998 0.303 3.293 0.001 (0.998)(e3D) 
TimeP No Numerator Lag 0 0.000 0.000 4.664 0.000 ((3.42(E-8)+3.95(E-8B))/(-
1.113B+0.504B2))(TimePR) 
Lag 1 0.000 0.000 -6.306 0.000  
Denominator Lag 1 -1.113 0.086 -12.942 0.000  
Lag 2 -0.504 0.082 -6.139 0.000  
TimeFCL No Numerator Lag 0 0.000 0.000 -3.264 0.001 0.000 
y=(-0.131)+(0.115)(q1Dt+2)+(1.316)(q1MP)+(-0.225)(q1WP)+(0.002)(Buss_Simt+6)+(0.998)(e3D)+ 
((3.42(E-8)+3.95(E-8B))/(-1.113B+0.504B
2
))(TimePR)+αt 
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Table 23: q at One Week after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_3 q1W No AR Lag 1 -0.490 0.162 -3.026 0.003 (-0.490)(q1W) 
MA Lag 1 -0.519 0.158 -3.291 0.001 (-0.519B+0.071B
12
)(q1W) 
Lag 12 -0.071 0.019 -3.795 0.000  
Sml_Lossq1W No  Delay 7.000    (0.007)(Sml_Lossq1Wt+7) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.007 0.003 2.288 0.022  
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 0.022 0.004 5.016 0.000 (0.022)(q1MP) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 0.375 0.027 13.887 0.000 (0.375-0.111B
2
)(q1WP) 
Lag 2 0.111 0.028 3.988 0.000  
q1DP No Numerator Lag 0 0.610 0.028 21.881 0.000 (0.610+0.111B
2
)(q1DP) 
Lag 2 -0.111 0.028 -3.947 0.000  
Sim_Prior No  Delay 4.000    (0.028)(Sim_Priort+4) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.028 0.008 3.386 0.001  
Buss_Sim No  Delay 8.000    (0.000)(Buss_Simt+8) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.000 0.000 -2.110 0.035  
Sml_Losse3D No  Delay 1.000    (-0.003/0.570B
2
)(Sml_Losse1Wt+1) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.003 0.001 -3.367 0.001  
Denominator Lag 2 0.570 0.162 3.517 0.000  
Sml_Losse1W No  Delay 7.000    (-0.004)(Sml_Losse1Wt+7) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.004 0.002 -1.907 0.057  
For Bid No  Delay 6.000    (-0.024)(For_Bidt+6) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.024 0.008 -2.910 0.004  
Adv No  Delay 4.000    (0.012)(Advt+4) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.012 0.006 2.156 0.031  
y=(0.007)(Sml_Lossq1Wt+7)+(0.022)(q1MP)+(0.375-0.111B2)(q1WP)+ 
(0.610+0.111B
2
)(q1DP)+(0.028)(Sim_Priort+4)+0+(-0.003/0.570B
2
)(Sml_Losse1Wt+1)+(-0.004)(Sml_Losse1Wt+7)+ 
(-0.024)(For_Bidt+6)+(0.012)(Advt+4)+[((-0.519B+0.071B12)/(-0.490B))αt] 
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Table 24: q at Two Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_4 q2Y No  Constant 0.589 0.093 6.345 0.000 0.059 
Sml_Lossq2Y No  Delay 3.000    (0.192)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.192 0.101 1.899 0.058  
Sml_Lossq5Y No  Delay 3.000    (0.202)(Sml_Lossq5Yt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.202 0.080 2.524 0.012  
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 0.233 0.024 9.749 0.000 (0.233)(q1MP) 
For Bid No Numerator Lag 0 0.739 0.152 4.872 0.000 (0.739)(For_Bid) 
Adv No Numerator Lag 0 -0.238 0.108 -2.203 0.028 (-0.238)(Adv) 
Pay No  Delay 6.000    (-1.234)(Payt+6) 
Numerator Lag 0 -1.234 0.299 -4.128 0.000  
Fin No  Delay 6.000    (0.011)(Fint+6) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.011 0.003 3.914 0.000  
y=0.059+(0.192)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3)+(0.202)(Sml_Lossq5Yt+3)+(0.233)(q1MP)+(0.739)(For_Bid)+(-0.238)(Adv)+ 
(-1.234)(Payt+6)+(0.011)(Fint+6)+αt 
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Table 25: q at Three Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_5 q3Y No  Constant 0.437 0.051 8.543 0.000 0.437 
MA Lag 1 -0.009 0.021 -0.409 0.683 (-0.009B+0.016B9)(q3Y) 
Lag 9 0.016 0.021 0.754 0.451  
Sml_Lossq2Y No  Delay 3.000    (0.158)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.158 0.059 2.667 0.008  
Sml_Lossq5Y No  Delay 3.000    (0.138)(Sml_Lossq5Yt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.138 0.049 2.839 0.005  
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 0.290 0.045 6.375 0.000 (0.290)(q1MP) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 1.548 0.289 5.350 0.000 (1.548)(q1WP) 
q1DP No Numerator Lag 0 -1.465 0.300 -4.875 0.000 (-1.465)(q1DP) 
For Bid No Numerator Lag 0 0.344 0.089 3.865 0.000 (0.344)(For_Bid) 
Adv No Numerator Lag 0 -0.157 0.064 -2.458 0.014 (-0.157)(Adv) 
y=0.437+(0.158)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3)+(0.138)(Sml_Lossq5Yt+3)+(0.290)(q1MP)+(1.548)(q1WP)+ 
(-1.465)(q1DP)+(0.344)(For_Bid)+(-0.157)(Adv)+[(-0.009B+0.016B9)(q3Y)αt] 
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Table 26: q at Five Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model_6 q5Y No  Constant -0.439 0.048 -9.214 0.000 -0.439 
MA Lag 1 -0.072 0.024 -2.997 0.003 (-0.072B)(q5Y) 
q1MP No Numerator Lag 0 0.460 0.053 8.620 0.000 (0.460)(q5Y) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 4.899 0.363 13.493 0.000 (4.899)(q1WP) 
q1DP No Numerator Lag 0 -4.084 0.380 -10.749 0.000 (-4.084)(q1DP) 
e1WK No  Delay 7.000    (0.451-1.188B)(e1WKt+7) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.451 0.489 0.922 0.356  
Lag 1 -1.188 0.497 -2.391 0.017  
For Bid No  Delay 1.000    (0.321)(For_Bidt+1) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.321 0.105 3.065 0.002  
y=(-0.439)+(0.460)(q5Y)+(4.899)(q1WP)+(-4.084)(q1DP)+(0.451-1.188B)(e1WKt+7)+(0.321)(For_Bidt+1) 
+[(-0.072B)(q5Y)αt] 
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APPENDIX E. ARIMA MODEL AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR CAR 
In this appendix, the two models developed for Cumulative Abnormal Returns are provided for each period in the study. All data 
was used in the following models. Table 27 provides the model summary information to include the Ljung-Box Q statistic. Table 
28 and Table 29 provide the full models with transfer functions for each of the time periods. 
 
Table 27: ARIMA Model Parameters for CAR 
  Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Model Description Model Type R-squared Statistics DF Sig. 
Model ID 
e3D Model_1 ARIMA(0,0,0) 0.026 9.605 18 0.944 
e1W Model_2 ARIMA(0,0,0) 0.013 10.846 18 0.901 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
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Table 28: CAR at One Day after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model 
1e3D 
For_Bid No Numerator Lag 0 0.010 0.003 2.870 0.004 (0.010)(For_Bidt) 
Rel_Sz No Numerator Lag 0 0.000 0.000 3.226 0.001 (0.00002)(Rel_Szt) 
Adv No Numerator Lag 0 -0.006 0.002 -2.679 0.007 (-0.006)(Advt) 
Exp No  Delay 8    (-0.23)(Expt+8-Expt+7) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.023 0.010 -2.244 0.025  
 Difference 1     
Sim No  Delay 5     
Numerator Lag 0 0.002 0.001 4.152 0.000 (0.002)(Simt+5) 
Sml_Losse1W No Numerator Lag 0 -0.002 0.001 -2.532 0.011 (-0.022-0.003B
3
) 
(Sml_Losse1W) 
Lag 3 0.003 0.001 3.634 0.000  
Exp No  Delay 3    (0.002)(Expt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.002 0.001 3.070 0.002  
y=(0.010)(For_Bidt)+(0.00002)(Rel_Szt)+(-0.006)(Advt)+(-0.23)(Expt+8-Expt+7)+(0.002)(Simt+5)+(-0.022-
0.003B
3
)(Sml_Losse1W)+(0.002)(Expt+3)+αt 
 
Table 29: CAR at Five Days after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position   (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
Model 2e1W Rel_Sz No   Delay 2       (-0.00004)(Rel_Szt+2) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.000 0.000 -4.979 0.000   
Adv No Numerator Lag 0 -0.007 0.002 -2.818 0.005 (-0.007)(Advt) 
y=(-0.00004)(Rel_Szt+2)+(-.007)(Advt)+αt 
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APPENDIX F. ARIMA MODEL AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR SIC 28 q 
Appendix C is the ARIMA model and transfer functions for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 28 (Chemicals and Allied 
Products). SIC 28 was chosen as an illustrative example since it demonstrates the pattern that was anticipated ex ante for the model; 
namely, that the model fit ratios got progressively worse as the years progressed. Tables Table 30 through Table 36 contain the 
ARIMA model parameters and transfer functions for each of the time periods‟ q at the announcement, one-day, one-week, two, three, 
and five-years after the announcement. 
Table 30: ARIMA Model Parameters for SIC 28 
Model Statistics 
Model 
Number of 
Predictors 
Model Fit statistics Ljung-Box Q(18) 
Number of 
Outliers Stationary R-
squared 
R-
squared 
RMSE MAPE MAE Statistics DF Sig. 
qAnnc 3 0.997 0.997 0.092 2.167 0.049 16.863 18 0.533 0 
q1D 5 0.996 0.997 0.086 2.577 0.055 10.539 18 0.913 0 
q1W 2 0.997 0.995 0.106 2.955 0.068 12.415 18 0.825 0 
q2Y 5 0.783 0.743 0.880 40.000 0.551 38.343 18 0.003 0 
q3Y 5 0.354 0.354 1.491 430.530 1.002 21.669 17 0.198 0 
q5Y 1 0.087 0.087 1.646 700.624 1.228 33.255 17 0.010 0 
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Table 31: q SIC 28 at Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
qAnnc 
q1DP Natural Log Numerator Lag 0 1.00 0.00 262.57 0.00 (0.999)(q1DPt) 
Sml_Lossq2Y No 
 Delay 3.00    (-0.002/-0.86B)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 -0.02 0.01 -4.20 0.00  
Denominator Lag 1 -0.86 0.06 -14.29 0.00  
e3D No Numerator 
Lag 0 0.58 0.10 5.95 0.00 (0.58+0.25B6)(e3Dt) 
Lag 6 0.25 0.10 2.58 0.01  
y=(0.999)(q1DPt)+(-0.002/-0.86B)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+3)+(0.58+0.25B
6
)(e3Dt)+αt 
 
Table 32: q SIC 28 at One Day after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
q1D 
q1MP Natural Log Numerator Lag 0 0.08 0.03 2.51 0.01 (0.08)(q1MPt) 
q1DP Natural Log Numerator Lag 0 0.92 0.03 28.12 0.00 (0.92)(q1DPt) 
Sml_Lossq2Y No 
 Delay 4.00    (0.03)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+4) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.03 0.01 4.12 0.00  
Sml_Lossq5Y No Numerator Lag 0 0.03 0.01 3.32 0.00 (0.03)(Sml_Lossq5Yt) 
e3D No Numerator Lag 0 1.01 0.11 8.98 0.00 (1.01)(e3Dt) 
y=(0.08)(q1MPt)+(0.92)(q1DPt)+(0.03)(Sml_Lossq2Yt+4)+(0.03)(Sml_Lossq5Yt)+(1.01)(e3Dt)+αt 
 
 
  
1
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Table 33: q SIC 28 at One Week after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
q1W q1DP Natural Log Numerator Lag 0 0.99 0.00 269.05 0.00 (0.99)(q1DPt) 
e3D No Numerator Lag 0 1.11 0.09 11.68 0.00 (1.11)(e3Dt) 
y=(0.99)(q1DPt)+(1.11)(e3Dt)+αt 
 
Table 34: q SIC 28 Two Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
q2Y q2Y Square Root  Constant -0.97 0.24 -4.06 0.00 (-0.97) 
q1WP Square Root Numerator Lag 0 1.73 0.40 4.28 0.00 (1.73)(q1WPt) 
q1DP Square Root Numerator Lag 0 -1.08 0.40 -2.68 0.01 (-1.08)(q1DPt) 
Sim_Prior No  Delay 3.00    (0.32/0.67B
2
)(Sim_Priort+3) 
Numerator Lag 0 0.32 0.08 4.14 0.00  
Denominator Lag 2 0.67 0.11 6.06 0.00  
Buss_Exp No Numerator Lag 0 -0.02 0.01 -2.56 0.01 (-0.02/0.87B2)(Buss_Expt) 
Denominator Lag 2 0.87 0.07 13.38 0.00  
Rel_Sz Square Root Numerator Lag 0 0.81 0.15 5.54 0.00 (0.81)(Rel_Szt) 
y=(-0.97)+(1.73)(q1WPt)+(-1.08)(q1DPt)+(0.32/0.67B
2
)(Sim_Priort+3)+(-0.02/0.87B
2
)(Buss_Expt)+(0.81)(Rel_Szt)+αt 
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Table 35: q SIC 28 Two Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
q3Y q3Y No MA Lag 1 -0.22 0.10 -2.31 0.02 (-0.22B)(q3Yt) 
q1WP No Numerator Lag 0 2.79 0.65 4.30 0.00 (2.79)(q1WPt) 
q1DP No Numerator Lag 0 -2.36 0.65 -3.63 0.00 (-2.36)(q1DPt) 
Sim_Prior No  Delay 3.00    (1.28)(Sim_Priort+3) 
No Numerator Lag 0 1.28 0.48 2.66 0.01  
Sum_Prior No  Delay 2.00    (-0.08)(Sum_Priort+2) 
 Numerator Lag 0 -0.08 0.03 -2.55 0.01  
Rel_Sz No  Delay 2.00    (0.29)(Rel_Szt+2) 
 Numerator Lag 0 0.29 0.09 3.31 0.00  
y=(2.79)(q1WPt)+(-2.36)(q1DPt)+(1.28)(Sim_Priort+3)+(-0.08)(Sum_Priort+2)+(0.29)(Rel_Szt+2)+(-0.22B)(q3Yt)αt 
 
 
Table 36: q SIC 28 Five Years after Announcement 
Model I.V.s Transformation Position  (ω(B))/(δ(B)) SE t Sig. Transfer Function 
q5Y q5Y No  Constant 2.15 0.29 7.31 0.00 2.15 
 AR Lag 1 0.21 0.11 1.97 0.05 (0.21B)(q5Yt) 
q1M No  Delay 5.00    (-0.20)(q1Mt+5) 
 Numerator Lag 0 -0.20 0.09 -2.19 0.03  
y=(2.15)+(-0.20)(q1Mt+5)+[(1/(0.21B)(q5Yt))αt] 
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